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FLOODING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM AND THE 
"TAKINGS" CLAUSE 
Saul Jay Singer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)l is a federal pro-
gram designed to make subsidized flood insurance available to home-
owners and businesses located on the nation's coasts and floodplains. 
The NFIP was promulgated as a quid pro quo arrangement: the 
federal government makes insurance available to community resi-
dents at subsidized rates in exchange for the adoption and enforce-
ment of floodplain regulatory ordinances by community officials. Pur-
suant to this arrangement, communities have regulated floodplain 
land use in a number of ways, including banning construction in the 
floodway; requiring drainage channels; designating detention areas 
for flood runoffs; enacting grading, construction, and building codes; 
and prohibiting construction below certain flood levels. A judicial 
finding that these types of floodplain regulations constitute "tak-
ings," thereby invoking the fifth amendment requirement that the 
government tender "just compensation," would effectively kill the 
NFIP. 
Since early 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
decided three important cases involving the key question of precisely 
what constitutes a taking of interests in real property under the 
* Actuary, Computer Sciences Corporation, Lanham, Maryland; J.D., University of Balti-
more School of Law, 1990. As actuary for Computer Sciences Corporation, the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) contractor, the author coordinates the rate and rule effort under-
lying the NFIP. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author, and in no way 
reflect official or unofficial positions taken, or to be taken, by the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency, the NFIP, or Computer Sciences Corporation. Finally, the author expresses 
his deep respect and appreciation to Professor Steven Davison, University of Baltimore School 
of Law, for his assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
'42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001-4128 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). 
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Constitution. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De-
Benedictis,2 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. County of Los Angeles,3 and Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission,4 landowners argued that particular regulations were vio-
lative of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, 
which provides that "nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation."5 Of particular interest to the federal 
government with respect to the National Flood Insurance Program, 
First English and Keystone concern hazard-related land use regu-
lations, while Nollan raises some other issues relevant to such reg-
ulations. The extensive concern generated by these three rulings 
require, at the very least, a reassessment of NFIP regulations vis-
a-vis "takings" doctrine. 
This Article assesses the potential impact of the Court's rulings 
on the constitutionality of the National Flood Insurance Program. 6 
It begins with a discussion of the nature of the flood hazard, the 
need for governmental underwriting of flood insurance, and the de-
velopment and scope of the NFIP. The Article then outlines the 
decisions defining when regulations might limit the use of private 
property so as to constitute a taking of private property without 
just compensation. Particular emphasis is placed on the three 1987 
landmark Supreme Court decisions on takings, or the "Trilogy." 
Finally, the Article analyzes the effect of recent developments in 
takings law on the constitutionality of land use regulations enacted 
pursuant to the NFIP. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Nature and Extent of the Flood7 Hazard in the United 
States 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has gath-
ered, compiled, and analyzed statistical experiential data on the flood 
2480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
3482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
4483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. v. The fifth amendment's prohibition against takings applies to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 241 (1897). 
6 The courts have clearly stated that the NFIP itself is constitutional. See Texas Landowners 
Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1028--33 (D. D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979). When the author refers to the constitutionality of the 
NFIP, the author means the constitutionality of NFIP-mandated regulatory controls which 
restrict use of property without just compensation. 
7 The Code of Federal Regulations defines "Flood" as: 
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hazard for eleven years, from 1978, when FEMA assumed respon-
sibility for administering the NFIP, through 1988, the most recently 
available aggregate experience year. 8 Even a cursory, superficial 
study of the results will show that a super-catastrophic "mega-flood" 
has yet to occur.9 In short, the citizens of the United States have 
escaped relatively unscathed from the flood peril, given the combi-
nation of increasing development lO in the floodplains and the lower-
than-normal flood loss experience over the last few years. The ex-
pectation that losses from floods will rise significantly in the near 
future is consistent with a finding by the United States Water Re-
sources Council, which estimates that annual property losses will 
exceed $4.3 billion by the turn of the century.u 
The Federal Insurance Administration (FIA), the component of 
FEMA which administers the NFIP, has undertaken many studies 
which make it clear that the very worst flood damages are yet to 
come. Sophisticated ultramodern simulation techniques support the 
proposition that a serious flood risk exists in the United States, and 
that both the private and public interests therein have not been 
publicized adequately. At present, nine out of every ten natural 
disasters in this country are flood-related. Ninety percent of Presi-
dential declarations of an emergency or major disaster involve flood-
ing. 12 Although only about seven percent of the nation's lands are 
floodplain as defined by the United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
the disproportionate present and expected future population located 
within the floodplain creates a potential flood problem. The Congress 
of the United States has made a specific finding that annual losses 
from floods are "increasing at an alarming rate," and attributes this 
(a) A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of normally 
dry land areas from: 
(1) The overflow of inland or tidal waters. 
(2) The unusual and rapid accumulation of runoff of surface waters from any source. 
(3) Mudslides ... which are proximately caused by flooding ... and are akin to a 
river of liquid and flowing mud of the surfaces of normally dry land areas, as when 
earth is carried by a current of water and deposited along the path of the current. 
44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1988). 
8 See Reilly, Leikin & Singer, National Flood Insurance Program-Flood Insurance Manual 
Revision-Rates and Rules Effective 10/1/90. 
9 Even Hurricane Hugo, which struck the Carolinas in September, 1989, did not cause the 
long-awaited, much feared billion dollar flood. Estimates show that Hugo caused about $400 
million in insured NFIP losses. 
10 "'Development' means any man-made change to improved or unimproved real estate, 
including but not limited to buildings or other structures, mining, dredging, filling, grading, 
paving, excavation, or drilling operations." 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. 
11 The Water Resources Council finding is cited in a National Science Foundation report. 
See NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUND., A REPORT IN FLOOD HAZARD MITIGATION 1-2 (1980). 
12 Id. at 1. 
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increase primarily to acceleration of development and habitation of 
flood-prone areas. 13 
Studies conducted by such diverse organizations as the Royal 
Swedish Academy of Science, the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA), the French Ministry of Environment, and 
the Congressional Clearinghouse for the Future, have sought to 
identify and rank the major environmental trends by surveying sci-
entists and other appropriate experts. Out of forty-seven identified 
issues and concerns, "floods" was ranked seventh, behind such stan-
dard threats as war, nuclear holocaust, and international terrorism. 14 
As with most serious threats to its physical and financial well-being, 
the public will attempt to protect itself against the threat of flooding. 
Insurance is the traditional method of protecting an owner's interest 
in property. 
Still, there is compelling statistical evidence that even inhabitants 
of flood-prone communities, let alone the public at large, do not 
adequately consider the extent of their flood peril. The total NFIP 
policy-in-force base was just over 2.1 million as of April, 1989. 15 
Since the FIA estimates that approximately eight million properties 
are located in flood-prone areas, only about twenty-five percent of 
those most seriously exposed to loss by flood are taking advantage 
of the availability of federally subsidized insurance. 
B. The "Flood Insurance Problem"16 
The government does not directly underwrite automobile insur-
ance, or homeowner's policies, or most other "traditional" property/ 
casualty lines. 17 Congress has found, however, that many factors 
make it "uneconomic for the private insurance industry alone to make 
flood insurance available ... on reasonable terms and conditions" to 
those in need of such protection. IS At the same time, recent studies 
indicate that although insurance does not, and probably cannot, 
respond to all the needs of disaster victims, insurance is the most 
13 42 u.S.C. § 4002(a) (1982). 
14 Conservation Found., In a Deluge of Problems, Where Are the Worst Threats? (Dec. 
1983), reprinted in R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 11, 13 (2d ed. 1985). 
15 COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP., NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: MONTHLY TECH-
NICAL PROGRESS NARRATIVE I-I (1989). 
16 Much of the material in this section was adapted from Singer, An Analytical Review of 
Issues Relating to the National Flood Insurance Program, THE FLOOD REP. (Feb. 1986). 
17 Though, in some instances and to a certain extent, it may act in the capacity of a "self-
insurer." 
18 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (1982). 
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efficient and equitable method of providing disaster assistance. 19 
Because the entire "takings" question only arises in the context of 
governmental action, explaining and understanding the govern-
ment's involvement in flood insurance and floodplain20 management 
becomes pivotal. A key question, therefore, is why the government 
must subsidize property and business owners in the floodplains and 
shorelines of this country. 
"Subsidized," in actuarial terminology, is defined as the state 
whereby expected losses arising out of a given group of risks, plus 
expenses relating to those risks, exceed the premium volume gen-
erated by the policies written. The word "expected" must be under-
scored because, at policy inception, no one can know precisely what 
the claims experience relative to a given policy will be. In rating an 
insurance policy, operating costs21 are generally well-known. Thus, 
the thrust of the "game" of actuarial rate making is to determine 
suitable rate classifications and to offer a solid prediction, employing 
mathematical and statistical techniques, of what classification aggre-
gate losses will be. 22 
N on-subsidized insurance is termed self-supporting or, alterna-
tively, "actuarially sound." In restructuring NFIP rating and cov-
erage provisions to establish an "actuarially sound" program, the 
Federal Insurance Administrator has distinguished the traditional 
definition of actuarial soundness from the NFIP's definition.23 The 
intent of the Flood Program is merely to generate sufficient premi-
ums to cover expenses and losses relative to an average historical 
loss year encompassing only the actual data gathered and analyzed 
19 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE: WHAT SHOULD THE 
POLICY BE? iii (1980) (Report by the Comptroller General to the Senate Budget Committee) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
20 The NFIP defines a floodplain as an area susceptible to inundation from either the overflow 
of inland or tidal water or the accumulation of runoff or surface waters from any source. See 
44 C.F.R. § 59 (1988). 
21 The term "operating costs" includes: 
(A) expense reimbursements covering the direct, actual, and necessary expenses 
incurred in connection with selling and servicing flood insurance coverage; (B) rea-
sonable compensation payable for selling and servicing flood insurance coverage, or 
commissions or service fees paid to producers; (C) loss adjustment expenses; and (D) 
other direct, actual, and necessary expenses which the Director finds are incurred in 
connection with selling or servicing flood insurance coverage .... 
42 U.S.C. § 4018(b) (1982). 
22 Insurers do not attempt to predict individual expected loss level for a given policy, except 
in lines where group classification is impossible or illogical, such as ocean marine insurance. 
See generally D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 550-51 (1974) (discussing the problems 
involving rates in ocean marine insurance) 
23 Reilly, Leikin & Singer, supra note 8, at 2. 
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to date. 24 Because the experience period and the data underlying 
the present rate level do not include consideration of a super-cata-
strophic flood, it is clear that, even as presently subsidized, the rate 
level and the ensuing premium charges are vastly understated. Ini-
tially, the government pays all losses out of premium dollars. When 
losses exceed premium dollars, which is nearly always the case, they 
are paid out of a Flood Insurance Fund25 established by the federal 
government tapping the ultimate government resource: tax dollars. 
Even if the Flood Insurance Fund should become totally depleted, 
the federal government, having legally contracted with NFIP poli-
cyholders to pay policyholder losses up to purchased limits of cov-
erage, has pledged to put the full financial resources of the govern-
ment behind these policies. 
Government flood insurance officials have estimated that if, some-
how, all American property owners could be compelled to endorse 
their homeowner's policies to cover the flood hazard, the price of 
this endorsement would be less than twenty dollars. Why, then, does 
the premium for an NFIP policy exceed $250? Whether merely as a 
limit on the police power or due to political infeasibility, the govern-
ment has not mandated flood insurance purchase for all despite the 
fact that automobile liability insurance, for example, is legally re-
quired nationwide. 26 The critical difference is that automobile liabil-
ity is so-called "third party" insurance; it is designed to protect not 
only the insured from his or her own negligence but, more impor-
tantly, to protect a victim of the insured's negligence from being 
unable to collect a negligence judgment against a defendant driver 
with no other means of financial recovery.27 
The courts have left no doubt that the government may compel 
automobile liability insurance, which is unquestionably in the public's 
interest in health, safety, and welfare. Flood insurance, however, 
like most property insurance, is a "first party" contract of non-
indemnification, with the only "interested" parties the insurer and 
the insured. The public interest in mandating flood insurance is 
therefore diminished. Furthermore, a property owner subject to a 
mandatory flood insurance purchase requirement may argue that an 
individual who neither drives, owns an automobile, nor is in any 
24 See 42 u.s.c. § 4015(a)-(b) (1982). 
25Id. § 4017. 
26 Subject to some exceptions in jurisdictions requiring such alternatives as posting bond or 
complying with extensive self-insurance requirements. 
27 Note that the defendant may be bankrupt, illegally escape the court's jurisdiction leaving 
no potential in rem cause of action behind, or otherwise creatively manage to escape collection. 
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other way susceptible to liability arising out of the use of an auto-
mobile is not compelled to purchase liability insurance. Similarly, if 
the property is not flood-prone and absent any apparent governmen-
tal interest, there is no rational purpose for requiring the landowner 
to insure against the flood peril. 28 
If the government cannot compel homeowners to insure against 
the flood hazard, the question arises as to why the government must 
subsidize those homeowners who choose to purchase flood insurance. 
The answer must begin with a consideration of the principles of 
classification ratemaking. 29 Ideally, an insurance system should be 
objective, cost-effective, and able to individually assess, review, and 
price each and every risk applying for insurance. In the large ma-
jority of property/casualty lines, however, this is impossible. First, 
the expenses underlying such a process would be unduly prohibitive 
and, second, virtually all insureds and insurers operate under serious 
time constraints which render individual risk assessments infeasible. 
The alternative to individually reviewing and rating each and every 
application for insurance coverage is to establish risk groupings, or 
to employ a system of classification ratemaking. In general, insur-
ance criteria for determining what constitutes a "good" risk grouping 
include: 
(a) there should be a sufficient number of insureds with similar 
risk characteristics to comprise a "credible" group; 
(b) each group should have a significantly different expected loss 
cost than average; 
(c) the determination of group risk characteristic~ must be ob-
jective, unbiased, and administratively simple to apply; 
(d) the system of risk groupings must be practical and cost-
effective; 
(e) the system of risk groupings must be acceptable to the public. 
NFIP risk classifications clearly satisfy these five criteria. 30 Zone 
and elevation are the two most important risk characteristics for 
classifying risks under the NFIP. 
28 This is going to be a particularly potent argument when considered in light of the nexus 
test developed by the Supreme Court in Nollan. See infra notes 231-57 and accompanying 
text. 
29 For a comprehensive discussion of classification rating, see D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL 
INSURANCE (1974) and C. KULP & J. HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE (1968). 
30 Congress has found that NFIP risk groupings provide the flexibility for flood insurance 
to be based on workable methods of pooling risks, minimizing costs, and distributing burdens 
equitably among those protected by flood insurance and the general public. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(d) (1982). 
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1. Risk Zones 
Floodplains are among the most difficult zoning features to delin-
eate, because they are governed by geomorphological features rather 
than by the political and social decisions that usually enter into the 
process of zone designations. 31 The National Flood Insurance Act 
authorizes the government to identify and publish information con-
cerning all floodplains and coastal areas in the country that are 
special flood hazards. 32 The United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
with input from a variety of other professional and technological 
sources, employs statistical analysis of river flow, storm tides, rain-
fall, topographic surveys, and hydrologic analysis to produce a Spe-
cial Flood Hazard Map (SFHM), which defines areas within the 
community susceptible to flooding. These areas are then further 
divided into flood hazard zones, or "insurance risk rate zones," pro-
ducing a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM).33 At least three pro-
31 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 7.03(2), at 7-16 
(1986). 
32 42 u.s.c. § 4101(a) (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
33 The zones are classified as follows: 
Zone V: SF HAs along coasts subject to inundation by the 100-year flood with the 
additional hazards associated with storm waves. Because detailed hydraulic analyses 
have not been performed, no base flood elevations or depths are shown. Mandatory 
flood insurance purchase requirements apply. 
Zones VE and V1-30: SFHAs along coasts subject to inundation by the 100-year 
flood with additional hazards due to velocity (wave action). Base flood elevations 
derived from detailed hydraulic analyses are shown within these zones. Mandatory 
flood insurance purchase requirements apply. (Zone VE is used on new and some 
revised maps in place of Zones V1-30.) 
Zone A: SFHAs subject to inundation by the 100-year flood. Because detailed 
hydraulic analyses have not been performed, no base flood elevations or depths are 
shown. Mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements apply. 
Zones AE and A1-30: SF HAs subject to inundation by the 100-year flood deter-
mined in a Flood Insurance Study by detailed methods. Base flood elevations are 
shown within these zones. Mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements apply. 
(Zone AE is used on new and some revised maps in place of Zones A1-30.) 
Zone AH: SF HAs subject to inundation by the 100-year shallow flooding (usually 
areas of ponding) where average depths are between one and three feet. Base flood 
elevations derived from detailed hydraulic analyses are shown in this zone. Mandatory 
flood insurance purchase requirements apply. 
Zone AO: SF HAs subject to inundation by types of 100-year shallow flooding 
(usually sheet flow on sloping terrain) where average depths are between one and 
three feet. Average flood depths derived from detailed hydraulic analyses are shown 
within this zone. Mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements apply. 
Zone A99: SFHAs subject to inundation by types of 100-year flood which will be 
protected by a federal flood protection system when construction has reached specified 
statutory progress toward completion. No base flood elevations or depths are shown. 
Mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements apply. 
Zones B, C, and X: These areas have been identified in the community flood 
insurance study as areas of moderate or minimal hazard from the principal source of 
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cedures exist for a community or homeowner to contest a FIRM 
determination:34 Letter of Map Amendment (LOMA), Letter of Map 
Revision (LOMR), and a physical map revision. 35 
Zone designations encompass a sufficient number of risks to com-
prise a credible group. These designations are periodically reviewed, 
and changes are effected where appropriate. For example, in 1986, 
FIA's research indicated that differences between the "A-numbered" 
designations (Zone AI, A2, A3 ... A30) were insufficient to warrant 
documenting and rating thirty different zone designations. Thus, 
FIA now designates and rates each A-numbered zone as an "AE" 
zone. 36 The number of zone designations has decreased from about 
212 to a mere nine as of this writing. 37 
2. Elevation 
It is axiomatic that the higher above Base Flood Elevation (BFE)38 
a structure is located, the lower the probability that flood waters 
will reach and damage the structure. It is therefore consistent with 
the classification criteria listed above to group and rate risks within 
a zone based on their height above BFE or, in short, on their 
"elevation." When each community's FIRM is promulgated, FEMA 
flood in the area. However, buildings in these zones could be flooded by severe, 
concentrated rainfall coupled with inadequate local drainage systems. Local storm-
water drainage systems are not normally considered in the community's Flood In-
surance Study. The failure of a local drainage sy8tem created areas of high flood risk 
within these rate zones. Flood insurance is available in participating communities but 
is not required by regulation in these zones. (Zone X is used on new and some revised 
maps in place of Zones B and C.) 
Zone D: Unstudied areas where flood hazards are undetermined but flooding is 
possible. No mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements apply, but coverage 
is available in participating communities. 
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NA-
TIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 20-21 (1987) [hereinafter FEMA, QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS); see also 44 C.F.R. § 64.3 (1988). 
34 A homeowner may wish to contest, for example, a determination that his or her property 
is post-FIRM, that is, constructed after FEMA promulgated a Flood Insurance Rate Map 
(FIRM). This is because structures constructed prior to establishment of a FIRM are generally 
charged lower rates than those constructed or substantially improved subsequent to the 
effective date of the FIRM, all other rating variables being the same. 
35 See 44 C.F.R. § 70; FEMA, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 33, at 21-22. 
36 As a result, newly promulgated FIRMs do not show zones A1-A30, but only AE. 
37 See supra note 33. 
:)8 Federal regulations define a "base flood" or a "lOO-year flood" as a flood having a one 
percent chance of being equalled or exceeded in any given year. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. Base flood 
elevation is therefore the height to which flood waters are expected to rise but once in 100 
years. It is interesting to note that, based on this standard, a homeowner in the floodplain 
with a traditional 30-year mortgage has a better than one-in-four chance of sustaining a 100-
year flood during the term of his or her mortgage. 
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ascertains a BFE. 39 Structures constructed or substantially im-
proved after promulgation of the FIRM and elevated above BFE 
are generally charged lower rates than other structures, even within 
the same zone, located at BFE. 40 Other key characteristics used to 
group flood risks include building type41 and occupancy type. 42 
Although risks are classified according to their elevation, zone, 
building and occupancy type, and other characteristics, no classifi-
cation is truly homogeneous. The grouping of like risks is a conve-
nient model only approximating an ideal, as risks with loss experi-
ence or claims history deviating from the average exist within any 
grouping. This lack of homogeneity is one basis of the traditional 
underwriting objective, which revolves around the identification of 
potentially profitable risks and the procurement of risks for the 
company's book of business, and leads to the heart of the reason 
why flood insurance must be subsidized. Consider that the most 
likely purchaser of flood insurance is likely to be neither someone 
who lives atop the Rocky Mountains, hundreds of miles removed 
from a potentially flooding water source, nor a resident of the desert 
where it rains about once a year. Inhabitants of river valleys, coastal 
dwellers, and residents of frequent flood areas and floodways are 
the traditional NFIP policyholders. 
Flood, as a hazard, is therefore subject to adverse selection-the 
situation where only the less desirable risks with higher expected 
losses choose to insure. The result can be a fearsome itch/scratch 
cycle: a poor selection of risks drives up rates, which pushes the 
marginal risks to either self-insure or not insure, which worsens the 
pool of insureds, which drives up rates even further, in an ever-
escalating, never-ending cycle. Because insurance is primarily a risk-
transfer mechanism, this situation undermines the very reason for 
the existence of insurance. Private insurers quickly learned that they 
simply could not profitably market flood insurance. As such, the 
federal government, yielding to pressure brought to bear by both 
developers and owners of property in the floodplains, stepped in to 
provide what the private insurance industry could not and would not 
supply. 
A further problem, compounding the need for governmental in-
volvement, is that the underwriting objective also must involve a 
39 See 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 67.4; see also 42 u.s.c. § 4104 (1982). 
40 See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL Rate-
2 (1989). 
41 Building types include one floor, or two or more floors. Furthermore, one-floor buildings 
are considered different building types, depending on whether they have basements. See id. 
42 Occupancy types are single family, 2-4 family, other residential and non-residential. [d. 
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demographic spreading of the risk. No insurer wants to place "all 
his eggs in the same basket." Spreading the risk over a variety of 
demographic variables minimizes the probability that a single event 
can wipe out the insurer's profitability or the insurer itself. Home-
owners live east and west, atop mountains and in valleys, in wood 
and in brick houses, are young and old, are rich and poor, are careful 
and careless and, in short, run the gamut of risk. All wish to be 
insured against hazards like fire and theft, creating a situation where 
the judicious underwriting of homeowners insurance provides a very 
good spread of risk. Very few of these same homeowners wish to 
purchase flood insurance, and they are closely packed on the coasts 
and in the floodplains. In fact, NFIP data shows that a mere three 
events usually are responsible for nearly fifty percent of NFIP loss 
liability in any given year. 43 
There is one last important distinction to be made between insur-
ing against the flood hazard and insuring against other traditional 
hazards. Flood is a low-frequency hazard; the number of events are 
relatively few but of high cost.44 On the other hand, homeowners, 
automobile physical damage, and workers' compensation insurance, 
for example, generate a great number of "events." It is for this 
reason that the flood ratemaking methodology, called "The Hydrol-
ogic Model,"45 cannot embrace the traditional loss ratio or strict pure 
premium approaches, whereby historical loss experience is adjusted 
to current levels and adjusted for trends impacting cost-per-policy. 
The mathematical, hydrologic formulae create a greater risk of in-
accuracy than private insurers are generally willing to assume, cre-
ating the vacuum that the federal government, in 1968, stepped in 
to fill. 
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NFIp46 
There are more than fifty years of developmental history behind 
the National Flood Insurance Program. Although flood experience 
and data prior to the twentieth century is sketchy at best, the flood 
43 Reilly, Leikin & Singer, National Flood Insurance Program-Flood Insurance Manual 
Revision-Rates and Rules Effective 10/1/85 (Mar. 26, 1985) ("A review of the paid losses for 
the three worst floods in each of the years 1978 through 1983 shows that they accounted for 
42% of all losses in those six years. "). 
44 In insurance parlance, they are "low frequency" and "high aggregate severity" events. 
45 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES: NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM-MAJOR CHANGES NEEDED IF IT 
IS TO OPERATE WITHOUT A FEDERAL SUBSIDY 11 (1983). 
46 Much of the material in this section was adapted from Singer, NFIP Retrospective, THE 
FLOOD REP. (May-June 1986). 
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peril was undoubtedly a problem in the late nineteenth century. In 
1980, Congress accepted federal responsibility for flood forecasting 
and warning. Congressional acceptance of federal responsibility for 
flood control, albeit limited, began in 1927 following major flooding 
through the Mississippi River ValleY,47 subsequently expanding geo-
graphically to a nationwide scope and functionally to include coastal 
hurricane flooding. 48 
Recognizing the considerable risk to life and property arising out 
of the continued development of the floodplain, Congress enacted 
the Omnibus Flood Control Act of 1936.49 The Act primarily served 
to direct federal efforts toward the construction of engineered pro-
tection works to control flood waters, and assigned the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers responsibility for these works and for 
floodplain information services. 
In the early 1930's, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was 
created as a regional resource development agency. Among its duties 
was flood control, primarily through the construction of dams and 
reservoirs. Later in the decade, Congress extended the Bureau of 
Reclamation's authority to include reservoir construction for pur-
poses of implementing flood control. 
In the 1940's the Department of Agriculture was authorized to 
construct eleven projects for flood control. In the 1950's the Depart-
ment carried out a nationwide program for upstream watershed 
projects. 
After a series of severe flooding events in the Midwest in 1951, 
President Truman requested that $50 million be set aside within the 
annual flood relief appropriation for a flood insurance program. The 
proposal was killed by congressional opposition and insurance indus-
try lobbying. 50 In 1952, President Truman, undeterred by the 
congressional opposition, increased his proposal and asked for $1.5 
billion to be earmarked for flood insurance. The plan provided for 
administration by private industry, and assumption of risk by the 
47 See K. HERBERT, THE FLOOD CONTROL CAPABILITIES OF THE ATCHAFALAYA BASIN 
FLOODWAY 15-22 (Louisiana Water Resources Research Institute, Louisiana State University, 
Bulletin No. GT-l, Apr. 1967), cited in Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Program 
and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 65 (1985). 
48 These coastal flooding areas ultimately evolved into the present day V-zones. See supra 
note 33. 
49 Ch. 699; §§ 1-7, 53 Stat. 1414 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 558b-l, 701b-l, 701b-
3, 701b-4, 701c-l, 701g, 707 (1982)). 
50 See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE FED-
ERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY'S NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 2 (Nov. 
30, 1981) [hereinafter FEMA, BACKGROUND P APERj. 
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federal government. 51 The proposal was again defeated by the same 
forces that killed the 1951 proposition. 
In the early 1950's, the TVA initiated a local floodplain manage-
ment assistance program. Nonetheless, there was considerable flood 
activity throughout the eastern part of the country, prompting yet 
another proposal, this time by President Eisenhower. In 1956, the 
President proposed a $2.9 billion flood insurance program, with a 
new wrinkle: forty percent of the premiums would be subsidized by 
a partnership comprising the states and the federal government. 52 
Although this program was adopted as the Flood Insurance Act 
of 1956, Congress never appropriated the funds for its implementa-
tion. 53 Congress's primary objection was the seeming lack of any 
kind of regulatory floodplain provisions within the Act. It was gen-
erally believed that rather than curbing losses in floodplain areas, 
the availability of subsidized insurance combined with an absence of 
floodplain regulation would stimulate further development of flood-
plains leading to even greater damages. 54 Again, insurance industry 
skepticism was a contributing factor in the Act's demise. 
The 1960 Flood Control Act authorized the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers to provide local governments with information 
needed to regulate the floodplain. 55 A series of natural disasters in 
the early 1960's again rekindled interest in a flood insurance pro-
gram. Related bills were introduced annually and killed. 
In 1965, a Presidential task force urged the legislature to adopt a 
policy emphasizing the modification of structures susceptible to flood-
ing. 56 Also in 1965, President Johnson directed federal agencies to 
evaluate the flood hazard before funding construction projects or 
acquiring federal property. 57 
One year later, after a decade of serious flooding, Congress em-
powered HUD to determine the feasibility of establishing a flood 
insurance program. The result was Title XIII of the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968, the National Flood Insurance Act, 58 
51 See id. This plan can be seen as a precursor to the "Write-Your-Own" (WYO) program. 
See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
52 FEMA, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 50, at 2. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Flood Control Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 480 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 33 U.S. C.). 
56 See TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL FLOOD CONTROL POLICY, A UNIFIED NATIONAL PROGRAM 
FOR MANAGING FLOOD LOSSES, H.R. Doc. No. 465, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,38 (1966). 
57 Exec. Order No. 11,296, 3 C.F.R. § 571 (1966-1970). 
58 Pub. L. No. 90-448,82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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establishing a joint private industry/government cooperative flood 
insurance program. This Act separated the flood insurance ratemak-
ing process into two distinct categories-chargeable premium rates59 
and estimate risk premium rates. 60 The Act provided subsidized 
insurance only to properties already existing at the time the area 
within which they were located was identified as a Special Flood 
Hazard Area (SFHA).61 
To qualify for the NFIP, a community must adopt and enforce 
floodplain management ordinances which regulate future develop-
ment in SFHAs.62 Furthermore, the community must meet the min-
imum criteria established by FEMA, including zoning, subdivision, 
hazard mitigation plans, building requirements, flood control proj-
ects, floodproofing of buildings, flood warning systems, and emer-
gency preparedness plans. A community must also establish a sys-
tem for the granting of building permits. 63 
The National Flood Insurance Act thus effectively negated pre-
vious criticism by mandating the adoption and implementation of 
floodplain management measures. In 1969 an amendment to the 1968 
Act was enacted, creating, for the first time, the Emergency Pro-
gram. 64 The amendment's intent was to increase participation in the 
Flood Program by permitting community participation prior to the 
completion of detailed flood insurance maps. The amendment ex-
tended the scope of the Flood Program to cover damage resulting 
from mudslide and mudflow. 65 
At this point, a major defect of the NFIP was its failure to equate 
federal assistance with the purchase of flood insurance. To remedy 
59 42 U.S.C. § 4015 (1982). 
60 Id. § 4014. 
61 See id. § 4012a (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
62 Community participation in the flood program is voluntary. However, if a community 
contains Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), determined by governmental mappers, and 
the community opts out of the NFIP, homeowners in that community lose their rights to 
federal financial assistance such as Small Business Administration or Veterans Administration 
loans, mortgages from federally regulated banks, temporary housing, low-interest disaster 
loans, and outward disaster assistance grants. See id. §§ 4002(b)(4), 4012a, 4022 (1982 & Supp. 
V 1987). Most significantly, then, if the President declares a major flood disaster, federal 
disaster assistance is denied those homeowners dwelling within nonparticipating NFIP 
SF HAs. See id. 
The General Accounting Office has concluded that the most efficient and equitable form of 
disaster assistance is insurance. See GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at iii. 
63 Minimum requirements for adequate floodplain management regulation are set forth at 
44 C.F.R. §§ 60.2--60.7(1988). 
64 Pub. L. No. 91-152, 83 Stat. 397 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S. C.). 
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(0 (1982). In fact, FEMA by regulation extended the definition of 
the term "flood" to include mudslide and mudflow. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.1; see also supra note 
7. 
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this failure, Congress passed the 1973 Flood Disaster Protection 
Act. 66 The Act made federal financial assistance for construction in 
flood hazard areas contingent upon the purchase of flood insurance. 
This federal assistance encompassed both direct aid from agencies 
and federally regulated or insured lending institutions. All commu-
nities with SFHAs were identified and notified, and procedures were 
implemented for communities to appeal their designations. Risk 
studies were accelerated, and the definition of flood was again ex-
panded to further include "flood-related erosion."67 
In May, 1977, President Carter responded to recommendations 
that the NFIP's established objective of protecting property and 
lives be supplemented with a new objective of protecting natural 
floodplain value. 68 The President ordered that federal agencies take 
appropriate steps to reduce the nation's flood vulnerability by re-
quiring the agencies to restrict public investment in the floodplain, 
including grants-in-aid to local governments. In 1982, Congress 
passed the Coastal Barriers Resource Act (CBRA),69 withdrawing 
the availability of flood insurance for undeveloped coastal barriers 
so designated by the Department of the Interior. 
The last major development to date was the 1983 birth of the 
Write-Your-Own (WYO) Program, in which private sector insurers 
market flood insurance, with the federal government acting as guar-
antor and reinsurer. As of this writing, the WYO Program has over 
1. 7 million policies, or about eighty percent of the total policy-in-
force base. Over 200 insurance companies have signed an arrange-
ment with FIA to sell and service flood insurance under their own 
names. 70 FEMA hopes eventually to move the federal government 
completely out of the flood insurance business. Unless and until that 
happens, however, potential constitutional challenges to NFIP reg-
ulations must be addressed. 
IV. THE TAKINGS PROBLEM AND THE NFIP 
No constitutional obstacle to future environmental legislation 
looms potentially larger than the problem of determining when com-
pensation is required in order to sustain regulations restricting the 
use of private property. The problem can be summarized fairly by 
noting that land use restrictions imposed by proper exercise of police 
66 Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S. C.). 
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(g), 44 C.F.R. § 60.5. 
68 See Exec. Order 11,988, 3 C.F.R. 117-20 (1977). 
69 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-10 (1988). 
70 See FEMA, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 33, at 2. 
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power, with appropriate consideration of and rational interest in the 
public's right not to be harmed, do not require just compensation 
under the fifth amendment, whereas eminent domain takings useful 
to the public do require compensation. 71 Eminent domain is an in-
herent and necessary attribute of sovereignty, superior to all prop-
erty rights. 72 The exercise of eminent domain power is, in effect, a 
compulsory sale of the owner's interest in the property, whereby 
the individual's rights yield to considerations of the public welfare. 73 
Therefore, eminent domain involves the taking of property because 
it is useful to the public, while the police power regulates the use 
of, or impairs rights in, property to prevent detriment to the public 
interest. 74 
While this principle may be relatively simple to state and compre-
hend, its effective implementation rests on the establishment of some 
clear line of demarcation above which just compensation is clearly 
mandated and below which it is not. Such line, though never absolute 
in a strict correlational context, should at least be such that the 
majority of reasonable analysts might draw similar conclusions a 
majority of the time. Obtaining a precise formula for when the fifth 
amendment takings clause is invoked is of particular import in the 
arena of environmental protection laws. It can be argued that not a 
single environmental statute has ever been enacted75 that has not 
evoked the standard, familiar arguments between those asserting 
the public's interest in preserving critical, scarce, natural resources 
and those defending the strong interest of individual private citizens 
to reap the maximum benefit out of their private ownership of prop-
erty, which, arguably, constitutes the very theoretical underpinning 
of American capitalistic society. 
The case history of takings law suggests a number of paths that 
the courts traditionally have followed in takings analysis and in 
characterizing the cases. No single theory has yet emerged which 
can serve as a comprehensive, universally applicable approach to 
resolving takings disputes. The Supreme Court often resolves diffi-
cult issues of constitutional law by establishing amorphous concepts 
and slippery tests, at least pretending that reasonable persons will 
71 J. ARBUCKLE, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK § 7.2.5 (9th ed. 1987). 
72 See e.g., United States v. 687.30 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Dakota and Thurston 
Counties, Neb., 319 F. Supp. 128, 132 (D. Neb. 1970), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972); 
United States v. 209.25 Acres of Land, More or Less, 108 F. Supp. 454, 459 (W.D. Ark. 1952). 
73 United States v. 5,324 Acres of Land, 79 F. Supp. 748, 760 (S.D. Cal. 1948). 
74 Cooper v. State, 48 N. Y. S.2d 212, 215 (Ct. Cl. 1944). 
75 Conversely, no bill has ever failed to muster sufficient support to attain enactment. 
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be able to apply the Court's test uniformly and correctly.76 The 
takings question has evoked a rare judicial confession of inability to 
devise an appropriate test. This inability has a serious impact on a 
society attempting to cope with a cloud of potential unconstitution-
ality hovering over many administrative regulations. No set formula 
exists to rigorously determine where regulation ends and takings 
begin. 77 Thus, it is difficult to know where to draw the line between 
a non-compensatory regulation and one that is justified. 78 Under the 
two-prong test outlined in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association 
v. DeBenedictis,79 for example, a land use regulation may constitute 
a taking under one of two alternative circumstances: either the 
statute "[d]oes not substantially advance legitimate state interests" 
or it "[d]enies an owner economically viable use of his land."80 
A number of general theoretical approaches to determine when a 
taking has occurred historically have been employed by the courts. 
For example, according to the "physical invasion" theory, when the 
government acts directly or through its agent to confiscate property 
and transfer ownership to the government itself, the government's 
obligation under eminent domain requires it to render just compen-
sation. 81 The utility of this theory is marginal at best, because while 
it effectively serves as a ceiling for non-takings, it systematically 
fails to serve as an adequate floor for takings. 82 If the physical 
invasion test were to constitute the definitive line of demarcation 
then, for example, virtually no environmental regulation could be 
deemed to be a taking since only in the rarest of cases does owner-
ship, as manifested through clear title, transfer to the government. 
In fact, physical invasion is only one of two alternative tests indi-
76 A favorite example of the Court's seeming inability to establish precise tests is the futile 
attempt to define the obscenity exception to the freedom of speech guarantee in the first 
amendment. A frustrated Justice Stewart remarked that he might not be able to define 
obscenity, "[bjut I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, 
J., concurring). 
77 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,594 (1962). 
7R Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). 
79 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
80 I d. at 485. 
81 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434--35 (1982). 
"[Wjhen the character of the government action is a permanent physical occupation of the 
property ... our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without 
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic 
impact on the owner." Id. (citations omitted). 
82 This test may be characterized as one failing to properly sustain "necessary/sufficient" 
scrutiny; though this is "sufficient" to establish a taking, it cannot possibly be absolutely 
"necessary." 
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cating when a taking has occurred. When no physical invasion is 
involved, there still may be a finding of a taking under Keystone's 
two-prong test if the required governmental use is non-public in 
character. 83 
Under the physical invasion test, however, the NFIP seemingly 
would survive the strictest scrutiny. Forbidding new construction 
below BFE, 84 sanctioning individual property owners or entire com-
munities for non-participation,85 and discouraging construction in 
certain areas,86 for example, would all fail to constitute a taking 
under this physical invasion theory, since the government would not 
be taking title and its "presence," if any, would be unobtrusive. This 
theory, considered independent of others, will not prove fruitful in 
constitutional analysis of NFIP regulations. 
A second theory considers physical appropriations other than mere 
title transfers as takings. The government's physical appropriation 
leaves no ambiguity that the owner has been ousted from actual 
possession of the land. 87 This approach seems to only insignificantly 
modify the placement of the threshold line. In particular, since the 
NFIP does not physically appropriate property,88 NFIP regulations 
are no more threatened under this test than by the physical invasion 
theory. 
A third theory, the "nuisance abatement"89 theory, significantly 
lowers the threshold line to a level at which concern can be generated 
83 See infra notes 191-230 and accompanying text. 
84 See supra note 38. 
85 See supra note 62. 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 4102(c) (1982). The statute provides that: 
[d. 
[TJhe Director shall develop ... comprehensive criteria designed to encourage, where 
necessary, the adoption of adequate State and local measures which, to the maximum 
extent feasible, will -
(1) constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage where 
appropriate, 
(2) guide the development of proposed construction away from locations which are 
threatened by flood hazards . . . . 
87 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 517 (1987) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
88 Under FEMA's "1362" program, funds are set aside to buyout the owner of property 
damaged sUbstantially beyond repair by flood. 42 U.S.C. § 4103(c) (1982). However, this 
cannot be construed as a physical "appropriation," because the program is completely volun-
tary. The owner must agree to sell the property, and the community must agree to "sound 
land management and use" of the property for at least 40 years. [d. § 4103(a). 
89 As the Keystone Court succinctly stated, "'[AJII property in this country is held under 
the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community. '" 480 
1990] FLOOD INSURANCE 341 
regarding the constitutionality of various floodplain regulations. In 
particular, the courts have determined that regulation of private 
property sometimes can impinge on the owner's rights to such an 
extent as to be tantamount to a taking of that property.90 The gov-
ernment may take property without compensation when allowing 
the property to remain in the hands of its owner would result in 
significant injury to the community at large. 91 However, if private 
property is destroyed without any immediate public necessity to do 
so, then the government must compensate. 92 The NFIP issue thus 
becomes whether or not there is harm to the general public when 
public property owners do not comply with floodplain management 
regulations as established by a participating community93 in compli-
ance with the National Flood Insurance Act. 
The government has regularly relied on the nuisance abatement 
theory to uphold health and safety regulations. 94 Prior to the Trilogy, 
U.S. at 491-92 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887». The Mugler Court 
further explicated: 
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by 
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, 
cannot, in any sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property .... The 
power which the states have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property 
as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not-
and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be-
burdened with the condition that the state must compensate such individual owners 
for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a 
noxious use of their property, to inflict injury on the community. 
123 U.S. at 668-69. 
90 The characteristics distinguishing a taking from a non-taking under this theory were well 
articulated by Justice Harlan in Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69. 
91 Id. at 669. 
92 See, e.g., Short v. Pierce County, 194 Wash. 421, 435, 78 P.2d 610, 616 (1938); see also 
infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393 (1922». 
93 The law prohibits governmental entities, even if properly motivated, from establishing 
building or construction codes in floodplain areas. In particular, the government would expe-
rience great difficulty in monitoring compliance. The Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) 
only markets flood insurance in regions where the authorized legislative body enacts appro-
priate loss mitigation regulations. Absent community administration of building activities in 
flood-prone areas, the aggregate loss potential cannot be adequately reduced to effect a 
reduction in disaster relief costs and warrant the existence of an NFIP. 44 C.F.R. § 60.l(a) 
(1988). 
A community as defined for the NFIP's purposes is any state, area, or political subdivision; 
any Indian tribe, authorized tribal organization, or Alaska Native village or authorized native 
organization which has authority to adopt and enforce floodplain management ordinances for 
the area under its jurisdiction. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. Floodplain regulation is therefore an amalgam 
of local, state, and federal laws. 
94 See, e.g., Young Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Iowa Natural Resources Council, 276 N.W.2d 
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statutory enactments requiring individual property owners to act, 
at their expense and in the interests of the general welfare, had 
been treated as if subject to a special presumption of constitution-
ality. Of particular interest in reference to the NFIP is a presump-
tion of constitutionality that has been formally adopted by the United 
States Water Resources Council and applied to floodplain regula-
tions. 
The use of the nuisance abatement theory95 often is criticized on 
the grounds that an inherent assumption underlying it is false, that 
is, that the private homeowner is somehow personally responsible 
for the public nuisance and hence must pay for it as a "wrongdoer." 
An NFIP example would have a homeowner purchase a beautiful 
plot in a floodway96 before the community opted to become a partic-
ipating NFIP community. At the time of purchase, the owner's 
contemplated construction plans would have been both lawful and 
inoffensive. 97 It would seem unreasonable suddenly to transform the 
homeowner into a wrongdoer who must absorb serious financial loss 
merely because the community enacted floodplain regulations. Thus, 
setting the takings line in accordance with the nuisance abatement 
theory would seem arbitrarily to harm innocent parties. 98 
Another takings theory requires the "balancing" of the economic 
loss to the landowner arising out of the government's regulation 
against the ostensible benefit to the public of having the use of this 
377, 380 (Iowa 1979) (Iowa Supreme Court upheld government's denial of a floodplain recon-
struction permit, finding that the structure would raise flood waters on the other side of the 
river); Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 657, 153 A.2d 822, 825 (1959) 
(Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that encroachment in a delineated floodway would increase 
damages to other landowners); Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1098, 1103 (1959) (development of the floodplain obstructs flood flow and results in 
greater damage to others; persons occupying structures in the floodplain are likely to suffer 
personal and property damage, and flood damage leads to public costs for flood relief). 
95 The Supreme Court has utilized the nuisance abatement theory to sustain regulations 
against takings challenges. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887); Plymouth Coal 
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 540 (1914). 
96 A floodway includes the channel of a river and the adjacent floodplain that must be 
preserved in an unobstructed condition to facilitate discharging the base flood while simulta-
neously retaining existing flood levels within one foot. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1988). FEMA 
mandates community flooding designation to reduce the likelihood of raising the upstream 
Base Flood Elevation. 
97 See A. RATHKOPF & C. RATHKOPF, supra note 31, § 707(c), at 7-65. "The hardest case 
legally is the one where a landowner's parcel, purchased before regulation was envisioned, is 
entirely included within a sensitive ... area where development must be forbidden to preserve 
... values." Id. But see Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 18, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 
(1972) ("An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural 
character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state 
and which injures the rights of others."). 
98 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 52-53 (1974). 
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land restricted. Under this theory, it generally is argued that since 
floodplain regulation creates so great a benefit to the public as to 
outweigh the economic cost to the individual, it is highly unlikely 
that NFIP provisions will be found to be a taking. Some commen-
tators criticize the basis of this balancing theory.99 Applying their 
criticism to the narrower NFIP floodplain regulatory scenario, it 
may be argued that if, indeed, floodplain regulation so evidently 
serves the public interest, the public ought to be more willing to 
assume the cost of furthering its much-vaunted interest. 100 
The theory most generally relied on in the majority of takings 
opinions is the "diminution of value" theory which, in contrast to a 
"balancing" of interests, focuses on the extent of destruction of the 
individual's economic interest in the land. This approach considers 
that government action amounts to a taking if its effects deprive 
owners of all or most of their interests in the subject matter. Di-
munition of value may be a taking. 101 Government action amounts to 
a taking if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owners of all 
or most of their interests in the subject matter. 102 Clearly elucidated 
as a principle in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,103 and specifically 
left intact by the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association 
v. DeBenedictis,104 this approach eliminates consideration of the gov-
ernment's interests, regardless of how extensive those interests 
might be. This approach, however, can provide no precise mathe-
matical model or hypothetical construct that FEMA or other regu-
lators can rely on to determine precisely where dimunition of value 
of sufficient magnitude has occurred to warrant finding a taking. 105 
Other tests have been suggested regarding the entire takings 
question.106 It is always possible that a future Supreme Court deci-
99 See, e.g., Michelman, Comments on the Ethical Foundation oJ "Just Compensation" Law, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1234--35 (1967). 
100 Taxpayers could assume these costs by either having the taxpayer fund the transfer of 
cash from the government to the regulated landowner, or having the pool of NFIP policy 
holders assume the financial responsibility by means of increased premiums. 
101 See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1947) ('''When the part not taken 
is left in such shape or condition as to be itself of less value than before, the owner is entitled 
to additional damages on that account."') (quoting Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897». 
102 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922). 
103 See id. 
104 See 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987). 
105 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citing Goldblatt 
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962». "[Tlhis Court has been unable to develop 
any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government." Id. 
106 See, e.g., R. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 31 (1985). Professor Epstein incorporates elements of other proposed tests into a 
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sion will either definitively elevate one test over all others, or even 
adopt a new test that will determine precisely when the fifth amend-
ment requirement to render just compensation is invoked. Until the 
Supreme Court does clarify the correct approach to takings analysis, 
however, we are left to our own devices to untangle the takings 
morass and to argue the issue on a variety of theories in the courts. 
V. FIRST ENGLISH AND THE NFIP 
Considering the general state of inactivity on the takings issue for 
the better part of the early twentieth century, it is somewhat out-
standing that the Supreme Court allowed itself to become enmeshed 
in three pathbreaking takings cases, all in the same year. Since 
deciding, in effect, that zoning laws are constitutional in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.107 and that constitutional zoning ordi-
nances potentially could be applied unconstitutionally to specific plots 
of land in Nectow v. City of Cambridge,108 the entire zoning field 
essentially lay dormant for over half a century, with local govern-
ments enjoying broad, largely unchallenged regulatory power. 
In light of this historically expansive treatment of government 
regulatory power, the few opinions resolving takings challenges to 
the NFIP and floodplain zoning have tended to apply the "Too Far" 
test devised by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
hon.109 The government began to expand its range of land use ra-
tionales, however, to encompass such diverse concerns as environ-
mental protection, historic preservation, and the maintaining of a 
proper ecological balance. In response to this perceived large expan-
sion of governmental powers, legal analysts and plaintiffs' attorneys 
began to argue that regulation could interfere so seriously with an 
owner's property use as to invoke the fifth amendment's just com-
pensation requirement. l1o Many trends seem to emanate from Cali-
fornia, and trends in takings cases are no exception. In particular, 
the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) concentrated 
four-part takings inquiry: (1) Is there a taking of private property?; (2) Is there any justification 
for taking that private property?; (3) Is the taking for a public use?; (4) Is there any compen-
sation for the property so taken? See id. 
107 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926). 
108 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928). 
109 See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text. As Justice Brennan noted in San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), "from the property owner's 
point of view, it may matter little whether the land is condemned or flooded." Id. at 652 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
110 See supra notes 71-106 and accompanying text. 
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their efforts in California because they believed the courts there 
traditionally have been particularly generous in their grant of reg-
ulatory authority to local government. 111 
The applicability of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles112 to the National Flood In-
surance Program's promotion of flood mitigation regulations need 
not be theorized, as the case deals with floodplain regulation directly 
in the form of an interim ordinance adopted by Los Angeles County 
prohibiting the construction or reconstruction of any building in a 
floodplain. The plaintiff Lutheran church had operated a camp-
ground, called Lutherglen, on land located in a canyon along creek 
banks serving as a natural drainage channel for the area. 
In July, 1977, about twenty years after the church's purchase of 
the land in question, a forest fire stripped hills upstream from Luth-
erglen of all trees and vegetation, creating a serious flood risk which 
was actually realized the following February when a massive rain 
caused the creek to overrun its banks, flooding Lutherglen and 
destroying its buildings. 113 The County of Los Angeles passed 
County Ordinance 11,855 imposing a moratorium on "recon-
struct(ing) . . . any building . . . any portion of which is . . . located 
within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood protection 
area. "114 The county's announced intent was that the ordinance was 
"required for the immediate preservation of the public health and 
safety."115 The church asserted that the L.A. County ordinance de-
nied it all use of Lutherglen. 116 When the legislature subsequently 
modified the ordinance's original characterization as "temporary" by 
enacting it as permanent law,117 the church nonetheless proceeded 
on a "temporary taking" cause of action, claiming that the govern-
III See Fulton, A New Erafor Private Property Rights, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1987, at 29. Cities 
and towns usually have broad enabling authority. See, e.g., NATIONAL HAZARDS RESEARCH 
AND ApPLICATIONS INFORMATION CENTER, STRENGTHENING STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGE-
MENT app. at 61 (1982) (discussing California's statutory scheme). 
112 482 U. S. 304 (1987). 
113 [d. at 307. It is interesting to note that the facts do not make clear whether or not the 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale held a flood insurance policy under-
written by the NFIP. The National Flood Insurance Act includes "church properties" as 
priority offerees of flood insurance. "In carrying out the flood insurance program the Director 
shall afford a priority to making flood insurance available to cover residential properties which 
are designed for the occupancy of from one to four families, church properties, and business 
properties .... " 42 U.S.C. § 4012(a) (1982) (emphasis added). 
114 First English, 482 U.S. at 307. 
115 [d. 
116 [d. at 308. 
117 See infra note 147. 
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ment owed it compensation for depriving it of all use of its land, 
albeit temporarily. 118 
In asking the United States Supreme Court to strike portions of 
the church's complaint alleging denial of the use of Lutherglen in its 
entirety, Los Angeles County relied on the precedent established by 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 119 which determined that where a land use 
statute is found unduly restrictive, the landowner's remedy lies not 
in monetary damages but in effectively striking the statute. 120 Thus, 
the County argued that a cause of action alleging a regulatory taking 
must be stricken, because there can be no such thing as a regulatory 
taking when the unconstitutional regulatory provision can be de-
clared null. 121 In Justice Rehnquist's words: 
Under this decision [Agins], then, compensation is not required 
until the challenged regulation or ordinance has been held ex-
cessive in an action for declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus 
and the government has nevertheless decided to continue the 
regulation in effect. 122 
The California trial and appellate courts ruled that since County 
Ordinance 11,855 had not previously been found "excessive," the 
government's continuation of the ordinance was permitted. The 
courts therefore held that the church's cause of action was properly 
in declaratory relief or mandamus, and agreed with defendant 
County to strike plaintiff's allegation. 123 
The Court accepted the church's assertion that lack of ripeness 
did not constitute a bar in this case, finding that the Lutheran church 
had sought compensatory damages through state-established mech-
anisms. 124 The dismissal by the lower California courts of the church's 
action established the unavailability to the plaintiff of any inverse 
condemnation procedure. 125 Given that the inverse condemnation 
vehicle maintains, as an underlying assumption, that a taking may 
very well occur without formal proceedings,126 the First English 
118 First English, 482 U.S. at 310. 
119 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). 
120 [d. at 275-77, 598 P.2d at 29-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376-78. 
121 See First English, 482 U.S. at 308. 
122 [d. at 308-09. 
123 [d. at 309. 
124 [d. at 312 n.6. 
125 [d. Inverse condemnation is a "cause of action against a government agency to recover 
the value of property taken by the agency, though no formal exercise of the power of eminent 
domain has been completed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979). 
126 First English, 482 U.S. at 316. 
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Court ruled that its Agins decision disallowing damages incurred 
before a statute's invalidation was in error.127 
The majority opinion emphasized that the lower courts never spe-
cifically ruled that County Ordinance 11,855 was not a taking but 
that the courts merely relied on Agins in deciding that monetary 
damages are unavailable as a remedy.128 The Court refused to con-
sider the merits of the cause of action, because the lower courts 
"deemed them sufficient":129 
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance 
at issue actually denied appellant [church] all use of its property 
or whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a com-
pensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of 
all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact 
safety regulations. 130 
In no way, then, should First English be made to stand as a 
decision favorable to the church regarding the substantive issues 
presented in the case: the validity of both the temporary moratorium 
on area construction and the subsequent permanent enactment of 
County Ordinance 11,855. The Court did, however, remand the key 
issue of whether the ordinance was truly a fifth amendment taking 
to the lower California courts for resolution. 131 All that the church 
effectively won in this case, therefore, was its day in court.132 
Although not directly ruling on the ordinance itself, the Court did 
go on to render a milestone decision. Tracing the history of key 
takings cases and the major principles the cases have come to rep-
resent, the Court concluded that though legislatures have indeed, in 
some cases, "backed off" a challenged land use statute, it had never 
before been decided whether the government has the obligation to 
pay compensation to the landowner for the loss of all use of property 
in the interim period between the time of the statutory enactment 
and its ultimate recision by the government. 
127 "[Wle hold that invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair value for the use 
of the property during this period would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy. " [d. at 322. 
"This period" refers to "the period of time during which regulations deny a landowner all use 
of his land." [d. at 318. 
128 [d. at 311-12. 
129 [d. at 313. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. at 313, 322. 
132 Even Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, emphasized this point: "[Ilt is imperative 
to stress that the Court does not hold that appellant is entitled to compensation as a result of 
the flood protection regulation that the county enacted." [d. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
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Prior to First English, authorities were in conflict on the question 
of whether a temporary use or occupation is compensable under 
eminent domain provisions. 133 Some cases upheld compensability, 134 
while some denied compensability.135 In particular, California law 
prior to First English appears to have denied compensability. 136 
In laying down the clear First English rule that where land use 
regulations deprive landowners of all use of their land, the compen-
sation requirement may be invoked even if the taking turns out to 
be temporary, the Court held, in essence, that the church could 
litigate for money damages137 only if it could prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it had been deprived of all use of Luth-
erglen. Hence, a landowner in the church's position still must dem-
onstrate that the only possible use of the land is to reconstruct the 
previous improvements on the land. Since this can rarely be the case 
because there are usually many more uses to which land may be 
put, it was quite predictable that the church would lose on the 
substantive issue on remand. Courts often have found sufficient 
value in non-developmental use of floodplains including, for example, 
recreation138 and agriculture,139 the very same uses the California 
Court of Appeal, on remand, held applicable to Lutherglen. 140 
The decision in First Englis~ resulted in a logical extension 
of the compensation for takings doctrine. 141 Given that the church 
failed to establish County Ordinance 11,855 as a taking, this case 
cannot present any overall challenge to NFIP provisions, nor to any 
local ordinances enacted pursuant to the National Flood Insurance 
Act. Neither the general rule that government may restrict access 
to hazardous areas such as land in the path of a life-threatening 
flood142 nor the general rule that property owners are not assured 
133 See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 113 (1965) and cases cited therein. 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946). 
135 See, e.g., Goodman v. United States, 113 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1940). 
136 See Department of Pub. Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 
(1960). 
137 First English was of great interest to scholars who have long debated the propriety of 
the California rule that a plaintiff in a taking case could not seek money damages. See Williams, 
Smith, Siemon, Mandelken & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 
193 (1984); Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to 
the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 Loy. 
L.A.L. REV. 685 (1986). 
138 Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972). 
139 Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972). 
140 See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
141 See Kass & Gerrard, Environmental Law-Excessive Sound, Fury Over Land-Use 
Ruling, N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1987, at I, col. 1. 
142 See Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 
52 TEX. L. REV. 201 (1974). 
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by right that they will be able to reap the maximum return on their 
land use143 is in question in the post-First English environment. The 
government indeed may have lost some of its maneuverability to 
escape its liability to render just compensation because "no subse-
quent action by the government can relieve it of its duty to provide 
compensation for the period during which the taking was effec-
tive."144 But this is so only "where the government's activities have 
already worked a taking of all use of property. "145 
On remand,146 the California Court of Appeal affirmed the consti-
tutionality of both interim County Ordinance 11,855 and, in dicta, 
County Ordinance 12,413. 147 The court ruled that no taking of church 
property requiring just compensation had occurred. Interestingly, 
and perhaps uncharacteristically, the court seemed to delight in 
noting that its decision was arrived at with ease. 148 
With reference to the public interest prong, 149 the court found that 
Ordinance 11,855 served the ultimate public interest-that of pre-
serving human life. 150 With reference to the economic impact prong, 
the court found that the Ordinance by no means denied the church 
all use of Lutherglen. First, under a "whole parcel" type argument, 
eight of the church's twenty-one acres were left completely unre-
gulated. 151 The regulated thirteen acres could be used for agriculture 
and recreation. 152 Furthermore, the Ordinance actually conferred 
economic benefit upon the church through a significantly reduced 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("[TJhe 
mere fact that the regulation deprives the property owner of the most profitable use of his 
property is not necessarily enough to establish the owner's right to compensation."). 
144 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
145Id. 
146 First English Evangelical, Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 
Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1989). 
147 The permanent ordinance was never at issue in First English. See id. at 903 ("Nor has 
First English ever amended its complaint to allege the permanent flood control ordinance 
enacted in 1981 constituted a 'taking' of its property. "). The California Court of Appeal 
nonetheless examined the terms of Ordinance 12,413. See id. ("[Ilt is helpful to an understand-
ing of the temporary measure to consider the terms of the permanent ordinance."). 
148 See id. at 898 ("It simply does not pose a close issue under any formulation the Supreme 
Court has suggested as the appropriate test for judging when compensation is required."). 
149 The court noted that the instant case more closely resembled Keystone than it did Mahon. 
See id. at 900 n.9. While the court never referred to the "Keystone two-prong test" by name, 
it apparently relied on the test in its reasoning. 
150Id. at 904. In fact, 10 people drowned in the 1978 flood that prompted the passage of the 
temporary ordinance. Many more would have drowned but for the fortuitous last-minute 
cancellation of a handicapped children's outing scheduled at the plaintiff's 21-acre campground, 
Lutherglen. See id. at 895. 
151Id. at 903. 
152Id. at 904. 
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probability of loss to the church from runoff from adjacent properties 
similarly subject to Ordinance 11,855. 
The court completed its application of the trilogy to the instant 
case by noting that the Ordinance is tightly tailor~d to the substantial 
advancement of a legitimate state interest and, as such, the N ollan 
nexus requirement is satisfied. 153 
Having ruled that there was no taking in the instant case, the 
court went on to significantly narrow the applicability of the "Luth-
erglen Rule" by limiting the circumstances where landowners would 
be permitted to recover for temporary takings. Unusually broad 
discretion is granted the state to enact restrictive temporary regu-
lations to facilitate proper consideration of the evidence and to allow 
for the proper conduct of necessary studies. Though temporary reg-
ulations still must be reasonable as to purpose, duration, and scope, 
the court implied that there exist circumstances when a temporary 
enactment will be upheld, but an identical permanent statute will be 
struck. 
Since a plaintiff would carry a serious burden in attempting to 
convince a court that the NFIP deprived him or her of all use, First 
English must be found to be irrelevant to the narrower issue of 
whether NFIP regulations invoke takings concern. It cannot rea-
sonably be argued that any of the following NFIP regulations, for 
example, deprive the owner of all use of his or her land: requiring 
that buildings be designed and adequately anchored to prevent flo-
tation, collapse, or lateral movement of the structure resulting from 
hydrodynamic loads; requiring that buildings be constructed with 
flood-resistant material; requiring that subdivision proposals, as well 
as new development proposals, be reviewed to determine whether 
such proposals will be reasonably safe from flooding; forbidding the 
alteration or relocation of a watercourse without notification to the 
Administrator; requiring that newly constructed and substantially 
improved buildings be elevated to or above the base flood level; or 
forbidding any development until it is demonstrated that the cu-
mulative effect of the proposed development does not increase the 
water surface elevation of the base flood more than one foot any-
where in the community.154 In each of these cases, the government 
can hypothesize some reasonable use that is left to the landowner. 
It can be argued that even where the government seems to impose 
a very severe restriction on land use, as with the previously cited 
153 See infra notes 237-58 and accompanying text. 
154 These regulations may be found at 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (1988). 
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prohibition of all development when the net result is a rise in BFE, 
a range of non-developmental uses is still well within the owner's 
province. 
Apparently in response to First English, President Reagan issued 
Executive Order 12,630, ordering all federal agencies, including 
FEMA, and departments, including the FIA, to assess the potential 
cost of possible condemnation actions that might arise from a regu-
lation, and to incorporate this assessment as an integral part of the 
legislation. 155 This Order arguably may cause regulators to become 
somewhat "gun-shy," by increasing their fear of excessive 
litigation156 and the ensuing potential costs so much as to prevent 
them from passing truly necessary legislation. 157 First English itself 
may give governmental bodies reason to pause if regulations sought 
to be enacted completely prevent development of a parcel for a 
period of time. 158 This hesitation to enact controls would be most 
unfortunate with reference to the NFIP, because the rationality of 
its public purpose cannot be challenged successfully, and, further-
more, the effectiveness of its program should not be hindered. It is 
also possible after First English that, with financial compensation 
at stake, judges will be even more reluctant to find that a taking 
has occurred as the result of a zoning ordinance or floodplain regu-
lation. Such judicial reluctance might lead to even fewer damage 
awards. 
The lasting impact of First English is likely to lie in the realm of 
the psychological. Floodplain management people, local community 
jurisdictions, and FEMA in general should not allow this case to 
inhibit its regulatory activities or its Flood Program. In particular, 
a FEMA task force presently is working toward designing and ef-
fecting a Community Rating Program, the purpose of which is to 
offer policyholders in participating communities significantly reduced 
insurance premiums in exchange for the community's adoption of 
loss mitigation measures that go above and beyond the baseline flood 
control and floodplain management statutes mandated by the NFIP. 
Considering the foregoing analysis, it is not expected that the First 
155 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554-59 (1989). 
156 As Justice Stevens noted in his First English dissent, "[tlhe Court's decision today will 
generate a great deal of litigation. Most of it, I believe, will be unproductive." 482 U.S. 304, 
322 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
157 See Order Aligns Condemnation Policy with Court, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 1988, at 5, 
cols. 1--3. 
158 See Dunlap, Ruling May Dampen Ardor of New York Planners, N.Y. Times, June 10, 
1987, at A26, col. 1. 
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English holding will in any way chill this task force's very important 
activities. 
In conclusion, the land use regulations that are "most certain to 
survive even the most hostile judicial reading are those that have 
explicit health and safety goals, have variance procedures, allow at 
least some use of the protected property, and are administered 
swiftly and fairly. "159 This list of attributes describes the National 
Flood Insurance Program quite well. 
VI. KEYSTONE AND THE NFIP 
Analysis will show that it is the earliest of the Trilogy, Keystone, 
and not the better-known First English, that ought to be generating 
great media coverage and public preoccupation, particularly given 
Keystone's potentially devastating impact on statutes regulating nat-
ural hazards such as the flood hazard. 
The narrow holding in Keystone is particularly important because 
it validates a Pennsylvania regulation virtually identical to earlier 
regulations overturned by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon160 in 1922. Under Keystone's two-prong test, a land 
use regulation may be a taking if either: (1) the regulation does not 
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose; or (2) the regu-
lation denies the owner all economically viable use of his or her 
land. 161 Analysis of Keystone, however, yields a number of important 
indications that the Court tip-toed carefully around Mahon, seem-
ingly gyrating this way and that to avoid directly overruling M a-
hon. 162 It is also important to note that though Keystone and Mahon 
deal specifically with land surface subsidence, the Court's underlying 
approach and rationale undoubtedly apply to the flood hazard as 
well, because both subsidence and flood plain regulations are public 
interest regulations geared toward hazard mitigation and reduction. 
In Mahon, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Pennsylvania Coal 
Company from continuing to mine coal from under the Mahons' 
property on the grounds that such act ultimately would lead to the 
subsidence of their dwelling, thereby subjecting them to serious 
financial loss. The Mahons admitted that their ownership in the land 
15. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 141, at 40, col. 2. 
160 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
161 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987). 
162 Mahon had been considered the last word in defining the limit of governmental power 
regarding land regulation. See A.J. CASNER & W.B. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 
1115 (1984). 
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extended only to surface soil rights, and they impliedly conceded 
that the Pennsylvania Coal Company's proposed actions would not 
constitute direct interference with their rights. The Mahons' claim 
rested upon the Kohler Act,163 a recently-enacted Pennsylvania stat-
ute seemingly very much on point. The Kohler Act prohibited all 
mining causing subsidence under certain structures. 164 The plaintiffs 
argued that the Kohler Act was a proper exercise of police power, 
intended to protect human life and uphold the general welfare. 165 
The defendant countered that the Act was an impermissible uncom-
pensated taking of private property solely for the benefit of a par-
ticular class and not for the benefit of the public generally. 166 
Writing for the Mahon Court, Justice Holmes ruled that the ex-
tent of the public interest underlying the enactment of the Kohler 
Act was insufficient to warrant destruction of the coal company's 
right to mine the land. 167 In particular, said the Court, the Kohler 
Act served only the very private interests of homeowners such as 
the Mahons. 168 Furthermore, the Act made it infeasible for the coal 
company to mine anthracite coal. Hidden away in a footnote in 
Keystone is a possible interpretation of Mahon: "the Kohler Act may 
be read to prohibit mining that causes any subsidence-not just 
subsidence that results in damage to surface structures. The record 
in this case indicates that subsidence will almost always occur even-
tually."169 It is possible to infer from this language that the Keystone 
Court believed that the Mahon Court overturned the Act because 
of the very high probability that virtually any act of mining would 
lead to at least a partial subsidence. The substantive result of the 
Kohler Act would therefore be the total taking of the Pennsylvania 
Coal Company's estate in land, an interest emphasized to great 
degree by the Mahon Court. In contrast, the Pennsylvania Bitumi-
nous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Pennsylvania 
Subsidence Act, or PSA) 170 challenged by the Keystone Bituminous 
163 Kohler Act, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661-71 (Purdon 
1966)). 
164 The Act listed public buildings, public service facilities, homes, cemeteries and related 
structures as such structures. PA. STAT. ANN. § 661. The Mahons' home thus fell within the 
ambit of the statute. 
165 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 405 (1922). 
166 See id. at 396-99, 404. 
167 See id. at 414-15. 
168 See id. at 413. 
169 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484 n.13 (1987) (emphasis 
added). 
170 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.6 (Purdon Supp. 1989). 
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Coal Association in Keystone only required that fifty percent of the 
coal underneath certain structures be kept in place to provide surface 
support. 171 
Section 4 of the PSA prohibited coal mining causing subsidence 
damage beneath pre-existing public buildings, private dwellings, and 
cemeteries.172 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re-
sources' (DER's) implementing regulation required that half of the 
coal beneath section 4 protected structures be kept in place as sup-
port.173 In Keystone, the plaintiff coal companies, legal owners of 
underground coal reserves, sought to enjoin the DER from enforcing 
the PSA. The coal companies argued that section 4 wrought an 
unconstitutional taking, and relied in large part on Mahon for pre-
cedential support.174 
The Keystone Court attempted to distinguish the Kohler Act from 
the PSA, rendering a final interpretation that the PSA was an Act 
intended to halt "a significant threat to the common welfare."175 The 
171 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 477. 
172 Unlike Mahon, where the validity of the statute's protection of private homes was 
challenged, Keystone involved a facial challenge to the validity of protecting both private and 
public structures. Compare supra note 164 and accompanying text with Keystone, 480 U.S. 
at 485-88. 
173 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476-77. 
174 Section 6 of the PSA, also challenged by the Association, provided that the Department 
of Environmental Resources (DER) may revoke a mining permit if coal removal under a 
section 4 protected structure causes damage and the miner has not, within six months, either 
repaired the damage or made financial restitution for it. The Association argued that section 
6 is unnecessary because Pennsylvania insures surface owners for the cost of repairing their 
property. Had it been upheld by the Court, this argument might have meant the end of the 
NFIP. Homeowners in flood zones would have analogously argued that floodplain regulations 
and building permit requirements, for example, were unnecessary, because the NFIP would 
adequately reimburse the owner for any loss. The Keystone Court's strong negative response 
to the Keystone Association's argument is analogous to one that FEMA could employ to 
support the NFIP. Justice Stevens patiently explained in Keystone that the PSA was passed 
in the public interest, and not out of a desire to protect private parties. See Keystone, 480 
U.S. at 485-93. If insurance makes the homeowner whole with no out-of-pocket liability to 
the miner, there is little disincentive to prevent the miner from raping, or at least subsiding, 
the land. Presumably, in Mahon, had there existed insurance to reimburse the plaintiffs, they 
likely would not have sought to sue the Pennsylvania Coal Company in the first place, both 
the plaintiff and the defendant would have been satisfied, and no ultimate challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Kohler Act would have been brought. This is another strong argument 
supporting the Keystone majority. 
175 480 U. S. at 485. The Court cited section 2 of the PSA, which provides in part: 
This act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth 
for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the people . . . to aid 
in the protection of the safety of the public, to enhance the value of such lands for 
taxation, ... and generally to improve the use and enjoyment of such lands .... 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1989). 
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Court concluded that the legislative purposes underlying the enact-
ment of the PSA were genuine, substantial, and legitimate. 176 The 
legislature's stark assertion that "this act shall be deemed to be an 
exercise of the police powers,"177 however, does not automatically 
render it so. Were this the case, any legislature could easily circum-
vent the fifth amendment's eminent domain provision by ritualisti-
cally asserting intent. The inquiry, then, focuses on why the Court 
upheld the PSA and struck down the Kohler Act, and how the Court 
reasoned that the Kohler Act was a "private benefit" statute lacking 
the requisite level of public interest to empower the legislature to 
enact it as a proper extension of its police power. 178 
Justice Stevens cited three primary distinctions between the PSA 
and the Kohler Act that justified finding the former not to be a 
taking on its face and the latter to be a taking. First, he argued 
that, under the Kohler Act, if both surface rights and mining rights 
were vested in the same individual, owners could mine to their 
hearts' content and cause their surface property estate to subside 
down to China if they so chose. 179 Under the PSA, however, owners 
could not legally cause subsidence even to their own land without 
DER consent. 180 Under this analysis, NFIP land use regulations are 
more similar to the PSA than to the Kohler Act, in that landowners 
in a particular NFIP community could not voluntarily flood their 
own property, if for some reason they were so inclined, since this 
might create an increased flood risk to adjoining properties. 
The second argument raised by Justice Stevens was that, in Ma-
hon, other adequate means existed for Pennsylvania to accomplish 
its interest in the public safety than by enactment of the Kohler 
Act.lSl A mere notice requirement to landowners, for example, would 
have sufficed. 1s2 In contrast, the PSA was found to be designed to 
accomplish a number of widely varying interests. 1s3 This argument 
apparently stands only because the legislature that enacted the Koh-
ler Act was not sufficiently clever in citing its legislative justification 
and intent. Had the legislature that enacted the Kohler Act em-
176 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486. 
177 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.2. 
178 Many interesting hypotheticals leap to mind. What result, for example, if the Kohler 
drafters had incorporated language precisely analogous to section 2 of the PSA? 
179 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 487-88. 
18°Id. at 486; see also 25 PA. CODE § 89. 145(b) (1983). 
181 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486. 
182Id. 
183 Id. 
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ployed language analogous to section 2 of the PSA rather than their 
weak "safety" argument,l84 the Mahon Court could not have pointed 
out that Pennsylvania's interest in "safety" could have been sus-
tained by a notice requirement. Section 2 of the PSA relied on a 
number of different state interests, easily meeting the legislature's 
burden to support the requirements of mere rationality.185 Further-
more, the Keystone Coal Association had failed to set forth alter-
native approaches by which the state could otherwise promote its 
cited interests. The Court itself did not suggest such alternatives, 
thereby at least arguably opening up the possibility that had peti-
tioner Coal Association suggested satisfactory alternatives, the 
Court might have struck down the PSA.I86 
Analogously, Congress has justified the NFIP by specifically find-
ing that a program of flood insurance promotes the public interest 
by providing appropriate protection against the flood peril, encour-
aging sound land use, and requiring that NFIP objectives be related 
to a unified program of floodplain management. 187 With this cited 
justification to contest, it would be most difficult for a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the federal legislative interest in the public welfare 
relative to the flood hazard could effectively be sustained in a manner 
other than by enacting the NFIP. 
In any case, though the question of whether or not the govern-
ment's claim that a particular use is "public" is generally one for the 
courts, a legislative declaration that a use is public has a strong 
presumption in its favor. l88 Still, as has been previously mentioned, 
legislative determination or declaration is neither binding nor con-
clusive. 189 Because "public use" is not generally defined and rests in 
each case on public policy,190 NFIP regulations after the Trilogy, 
though possibly subject to greater judicial scrutiny regarding their 
184 [d. Circumstances could potentially arise whereby the Mahons, their guests, or their 
friendly neighborhood mailman could find themselves in the unfortunate position of having the 
ground open up beneath them, much as post-Biblical Korahs. 
185 See id. at 486. 
186 A good topic for research and discussion might be how, if at all, the Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Association could have structured its argument to pull the PSA close enough to Mahon's 
Kohler scenario to allow the Court to characterize it too as a taking. 
187 See 42 U.S.C. § 400l(c) (1982). 
188 Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assocs., 156 F.2d 316, 323 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 
U.S. 772 (1946). 
189 See generally 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 30, at 253-54 n.12 (1965), and cases cited 
therein. 
190 United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, Ky., 78 F.2d 684, 686-87 (6th Cir. 1935), 
cert. dismissed, 297 U.S. 726 (1936). 
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"public use," should satisfy the "public purpose" prong of the Key-
stone two-prong test. 191 
As a third distinction, Justice Stevens found that, unlike in Ma-
hon, where the Court upheld the Pennsylvania Coal Company's 
assertion that it could not profitably mine,192 the Keystone record 
fails to reveal where the PSA unduly interferes with the Coal As-
sociation's investment return expectations. In particular, the plain-
tiff failed to show that mining in any single specific location was 
affected adversely by the fifty percent rule, let alone show a decrease 
in aggregate operational profitability.193 Since the right of the Key-
stone Coal Association to exercise its support estate rights to mine 
virtually all the coal was preserved, the burden the PSA placed on 
the support estate did not constitute a taking. 194 
In general, the plaintiff's argument failed because takings juris-
prudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and 
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have 
been abrogated entirely. The court focuses both on the character of 
the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with 
rights in the parcel as a whole. 195 Under this so-called "whole parcel" 
approach, the courts have ruled that statutes limiting or entirely 
proscribing development of a specific piece of an owner's land lying 
within a mapped floodplain are not takings, since the owner cannot 
demonstrate that such restrictions limited all reasonable beneficial 
use of the land. 196 
With this whole parcel theory as historical precedential back-
ground, it is fortunate indeed for the NFIP that the Keystone ma-
jority refused to uphold Keystone Coal's argument that the esti-
mated 27 million tons of coal rendered beyond the reach of the 
Association's right to mine by the PSA was a separate and distinct 
property segment, itself subject to takings consideration and scru-
191 The "public use" doctrine is the prong of takings analysis that requires that private 
property, or an interest therein, can be taken only for a public use or purpose, and the 
legislature cannot permit a taking for a strictly private use or purpose without the owner's 
consent. 
192 Or, possibly, mine at all, creating a "total" taking scenario. 
193 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987). 
194 See id. at 493-502. 
195 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131, 136 (1978). 
196 See, e.g., S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v. Board of Appeals, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 
481-82, 402 N.E.2d 100, 103 (1980). Floodplain zoning prohibiting an owner from filling the 
portion of his land in the floodplain was upheld as constitutional. The court found that the 
land was not rendered absolutely worthless, citing specific uses to which the owner might put 
his land other than filling (including enhancement of his land outside the floodplain!) I d. 
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tiny.197 The Court argued insightfully that, under this theory, a 
simple local "set-back" property ordinance, for example, would con-
stitute a taking. 198 Employing analogous logic, a homeowner in a 
flood-prone community could submit that one of the Flood Program's 
most effective flood mitigation ordinances, that' which prohibits con-
struction of post-FIRM buildings below BFE, constitutes a taking 
which must be compensated. 
The Keystone majority noted that "there is no basis for treating 
less than 2% of petitioner's coal as a separate parcel of property."199 
Questions left unanswered, however, include: what if, for example, 
the local setback appropriated ninety percent of the homeowner's 
property? Twenty-five percent? What if, for example, Keystone As-
sociation could prove that it was denied access to ninety-eight per-
cent of its coal? Twenty-five percent? And, of direct concern to 
FEMA, what if particular parcels of property were entirely within 
the floodplain, making any meaningful construction thereon entirely 
impossible?200 The Keystone Court clearly stated that it will approach 
takings questions before it by somehow quantifying and comparing 
the respective values of what the government has "appropriated" 
and that which the property owner has been permitted to retain. 201 
"[O]ne of the critical questions in takings analysis therefore is de-
termining how to define the unit of property whose value is to furnish 
the denominator of the fraction."202 We again run up against the 
Court's inability to devise a useable formula. Because of this inabil-
ity, no precise line can be drawn, and individual cases will continue 
to be litigated. 
Given Keystone's affirmation of that portion of Mahon which re-
quired that Court to scrutinize both the character of the action and 
the nature of the interference with rights to the land as a whole, 
however, the government, including FEMA in its NFIP role, need 
not unduly concern itself with how the Court might view government 
interference with particular sub-segments of privately owned parcels 
of land. For example, the NFIP requirement that the landowner 
197 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498. 
198Id. 
199Id. 
200 This, of course, was also the outstanding, unresolved question relating to Justice Holmes' 
"Too Far" test: "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
201 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. 
202 V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
§ 13-1, at 1505 (1987). 
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maintain adequate drainage paths around structures situated on 
slopes203 demonstrably interferes with the owner's contemplated use 
of that area and, in fact, may thereby completely deprive the owner 
of any use of the land surrounding the structur{~. Such a plaintiff 
landowner seeking just compensation from the government will 
probably not prevail given the Keystone Court's emphasis on inter-
ference with the parcel of land in its entirety. Similarly, the govern-
ment's prohibition of encroachments within the adopted regulatory 
floodway,204 which deprives the landowner of the right to build on 
that part of the floodway intersecting his or her property, does not 
necessarily, under Keystone, entitle the owner to compensation for 
the loss of use of part of the property. 
Keystone is a classic "facial" challenge. 205 The Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Association asserted that the mere enactment of the PSA 
by the government makes for a taking. 206 In this vein, the Court 
noted that both parties specifically requested that the challenge be 
facial,207 since neither side was prepared to promulgate the "complex 
and voluminous proofs" necessary to assess the PSA's impact on 
, actual operations.208 Facial challenges are very difficult to argue and 
are rarely successful. Some commentators even go so far as to char-
acterize facial constitutional attacks as "a waste of time and 
money. "209 Even the most conservative courts often refuse on prin-
ciple to rule that a statutory enactment is a per se taking.210 In 
particular, the Supreme Court has ruled that the constitutionality of 
statutes ought to be decided in "as applied" settings;211 "[t]his rule 
is particularly important in cases raising allegations of an unconsti-
tutional taking of private property."212 Generally, if the ordinance 
allows for variances or an exceptions process, facial challenges will 
203 The purpose of this rule, effective in AH and AO zones, is to guide floodwaters around 
and away from proposed structures. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c)(U) (1988). 
204 See id. § 60.3(d)(3). 
205 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 
(1981). 
206 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987). Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), also presented a facial challenge, but there the Court 
ruled that the landowner was left with some adequate, reasonable use of his property. The 
Court therefore found that there was no taking. [d. at 262. 
207 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493. 
208 [d. 
209 See, e.g., A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 31, § 7.07, at 7-59. 
210 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970). 
211 See, e.g., Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 587-90 (1972). 
212 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 494 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981». 
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not be upheld because the plaintiff must show that the statute pro-
hibits any reasonable use. 213 It can be argued, then, that FEMA 
need not harbor any concerns regarding facial challenges to its NFIP 
regulations. 
The Keystone and Mahon decisions may impact facial NFIP tak-
ings challenges in other ways. Prior to Keystone, various state and 
federal courts in almost all jurisdictions had upheld regulations pre-
venting all economically viable developmental uses of land located 
within a floodplain by characterizing such regulations as designed to 
prevent serious harm to health, safety, and the property interests 
of others. 214 The New Jersey Superior Court, for instance, previously 
had upheld a statute that banned all development of plaintiff's land 
located entirely within a designated floodplain.215 The court found 
that the regulation furthered the public purpose of preventing harm 
to offsite persons and property in the event of a flood. 216 Similarly, 
the California courts also had permitted legislative enactments bar-
ring all development in the floodplain. 217 
The issues presented in these cases potentially may be reopened 
as the result of the Keystone holding. Although generalizations re-
garding the holdings are ill-advised, a pattern seems to have 
emerged. When the Court is convinced that a legislative enactment 
is intended to protect a defendant against a destructive plaintiff, the 
Court will grant considerable breadth of discretion to the govern-
ment, broadly interpret the rationality requirement, and generally 
uphold governmental regulation. In such situations, then, the Court 
will view the statute as a proper exercise of the state's police power, 
and will not find a taking requiring just compensation. So, for ex-
ample, the Court interpreted the PSA as a legitimate governmental 
remedy for dangerous conditions brought about by the Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Association. 218 In contrast, the Mahon Court per-
ceived that the underlying purpose of the Kohler Act was to "shift" 
213 For an excellent contemporary example, see Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 
N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
214 See, e.g., Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 227-29, 284 N.E.2d 
891, 895-96 (1972) (court upheld floodplain regulations that prevented all developmental uses 
but allowed agricultural and recreational uses). 
215 Usdin v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980). 
216Id. at 331, 414 A.2d at 290. 
217 See, e.g., Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 314, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 
95 (1972) (court upheld floodplain regulations that barred commercial, public, or residential 
development but allowed agricultural and recreational uses). 
218 See supra notes 175-86 and accompanying text. 
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the benefit from the plaintiffs, at their expense, to other parties, 
thereby justifying the Court's finding that a taking had occurred.219 
The Keystone Court's decision supports the proposition that, un-
der the public purpose test, the government can ban a nuisance 
without having to render just compensation. 220 The Court, however, 
never addressed the key question of whether compensation is re-
quired in nuisance situations where legitimate governmental regu-
lation of the property leaves the property owner with no reasonable 
use of the land. For example, Keystone does not resolve whether an 
owner of property comprised entirely of sand dunes successfully 
might challenge the NFIP regulation barring the alteration of sand 
dunes on property located within an NFIP community.221 The pos-
sibility that such a challenge would succeed presents a very real 
threat to floodplain management. 
Although land use statutory enactments should not directly pres-
ent constitutional concerns, the NFIP should consider itself on con-
structive notice that its building restrictions may be found to be 
takings subject to compensation, which the already subsidized Pro-
gram can ill afford. Recall that the NFIP is established as essentially 
a quid pro quo type of arrangement. 222 In exchange for community 
officials' enactment of floodplain regulatory statutes, the federal gov-
ernment makes insurance available to their constituents at subsi-
dized rates. 223 Underlying the federal government's involvement 
with the NFIP is deep concern about federal revenues used to pay 
losses exceeding collected NFIP premium dollars. These funds must 
be made up for with loss mitigation processes, such as floodplain 
regulations, which reduce the government's need to come forward 
with disaster relief settlements. In effect, no statutory regulation 
would translate into no National Flood Insurance Program. 
Pending further clarification of takings law by the Supreme Court, 
administrators, floodplain managers, and community officials should 
219 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
220 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 & n.22 (1987). 
221 See 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(e)(7) (1988). Of course, the government can still argue that the 
landowner retains some use as, for example, sunbathing. 
222 In 1965, a congressional task force concluded that a flood plain occupation in which the 
benefits of occupation do not exceed estimated total costs (costs of development and damage 
to the occupant as well as damages forced on others by encroachment) of occupation was 
undesirable since the net result to society would be a loss! See TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL 
FLOOD CONTROL POLICY, A UNIFIED NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR MANAGING FLOOD LOSSES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 465, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1965). 
223 44 C.F.R. § 59.2(b) (1988). 
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continue to regulate exposure to the flood hazard, albeit more care-
fully. In particular, a consensus emerges from the Trilogy that ra-
tionally based public purpose regulations, though diminishing the 
value of homeowners' interests in their land, will usually be deemed 
to be non-takings. In general, the Court will uphold carefully tai-
lored, narrow regulations aimed at public interest reduction of haz-
ard. Still, the Keystone decision indicates an increased willingness 
by the Court to examine the nexus between regulations and the 
purported regulatory goals. Note that Keystone was a five-to-four 
decision, with three "conservative" appointees, Justices Rehnquist, 
O'Connor, and Scalia, in the minority. The future composition of the 
Court, particularly if the replacement of the three aging "liberal" 
Justices is undertaken by a conservative President, may dictate a 
return to the strict Mahon approach advocated by Justice Rehnquist 
in his Keystone dissent. 224 Examination of the existence, or lack of 
existence, of nexus is an area more ripe than most for judicial action 
along lines of personal predilection by the Justices. Time, of course, 
will tell. 
In conclusion, despite decisions in First English and Keystone, 
building codes, elevation requirements, restrictions in the flood way, 
and grading codes statutes are probably immune from successful 
"facial" takings challenges. FEMA, however, must be particularly 
cautious not to encourage their participating communities to enact 
per se moratoria on all buildings in covered areas. 225 
The NFIP will also be immune to "as applied" takings challenges. 
The NFIP does not establish an absolute ban on construction in flood 
zones. Even the most restrictive NFIP regulation, that which "bans" 
development in the floodway, permits development in the floodway 
if it can be demonstrated that neither flood level, frequency of flood, 
nor severity of flood damages would increase. 226 Reading between 
the lines in Keystone, one could argue that had Pennsylvania enacted 
a statute completely eroding the Keystone Association's right to 
mine,227 such statute might have been found to be a taking. Similarly, 
an NFIP statute unequivocally banning all building might go simply 
too far. 
224 See 480 U.S. at 506-21. 
225 FEMA should also consider the potential for personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1982) for community and state officials, above and beyond the threat of successful litigation 
regarding money damages. 
226 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(d)(3) (1988). 
227 Alternately, the Court might have found a taking if the Association had proved that the 
statute reduced their bottom line profitability to the extent that they had to cease operation. 
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Even so, the NFIP has provided for the granting of variances, 
allowing a building permit where the property owner can supply 
evidence that only "minimal" damage to the legislature's public in-
terest concern will occur.228 Under NFIP regulations, construction 
in the floodplain will be allowed if the building is elevated to above 
BFE and alternate compensatory storage for floodwaters is pro-
vided. 229 The only NFIP enactments prohibiting all development are 
statutes regulating a river's floodway. Even there, however, the 
courts have upheld these bans due to the extremely hazardous con-
sequences involved in development. 230 The logical conclusion to be 
drawn is that after Keystone, although the Court will scrutinize land 
use regulations to a higher degree, the NFIP has little to fear from 
this anticipated scrutiny. The Court will most likely uphold regula-
tion under the NFIP. 
VII. N OLLAN AND THE NFIP 
The Nollan case, though mysteriously never even once mentioning 
First English or Keystone, considers if and when circumstances 
underlying the conditional grant of a building permit may be so 
adverse to the owner, and so limit the owner's use of the land, as to 
attain the status of a compensatory taking. 231 In general, the gov-
ernment acts under its police power when requiring that a landowner 
must meet certain conditions precedent before obtaining a requisite 
construction permit.232 Specifically, when communities pass flood mit-
igation statutes which, for example, condition the grant of a building 
permit to a floodplain landowner upon the owner's agreement to 
elevate the structure so that it is entirely above the BFE, FEMA 
has impliedly assumed that imposing this contingency is a valid 
228 44 C.F.R. § 60.6(a)(3). The regulation states: 
Id. 
Variances shall only be issued by a community upon (i) a showing of good and 
sufficient cause, (ii) a determination that failure to grant the variance would result 
in exceptional hardship to the applicant, and (iii) a determination that the granting 
of the variance will not result in ... additional threats to public safety .... 
229Id. § 60.3. 
230 See, e.g., Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 
565 P.2d 1162 (1977) (court upheld denial of construction permit for building in the Cedar 
River flood way, validating both the regulatory statute itself and the enactments passed 
pursuant to it). 
231 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
232 See Iowa Natural Resources Council v. Van Zee, 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W.2d 111 (1968) 
(court sustained Iowa floodplain regulatory law requiring a permit before any building con-
struction in a floodplain). 
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exercise of its police power not requiring just compensation. This 
assumption and others of its ilk may require serious re-examination 
in the wake of N ollan. 
The N ollans leased a beachfront property improved by a small 
bungalow. To exercise their option to purchase the property, they 
were required to demolish the bungalow and replace it. To replace 
the bungalow, state law required them to obtain a development 
permit from the California Coastal Commission (CCC).233 The CCC 
granted the N ollans' permit application to build a three bedroom 
house on condition that the N ollans grant a public easement along 
the shoreline to facilitate the public's ability to reach the public 
beaches located both north and south of the property.234 In admin-
istrative hearings and in the lower courts, the Nollans argued that 
absent CCC evidence showing that their "proposed development 
would have a direct adverse impact on public access to the beach, "235 
the governmental imposition of the easement condition was tanta-
mount to a taking for which the N ollans had to be compensated. The 
CCC cited a state interest in preserving the public's view of the 
ocean, arguing also that the construction of homes and the devel-
opment of areas along the coast constitutes a "psychological barrier" 
severely restricting the public's ingress to and egress from the 
beach.236 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that had the CCC 
directly required the N ollans to grant a public easement across their 
property, rather than making the grant of such an easement a con-
dition precedent to the granting of a construction permit, such a 
requirement surely would constitute a taking.237 The Court, equating 
a permanent, continuous right of public passage across property with 
a physical occupation, ruled that the state cannot escape compen-
sation liability by indirect imposition of a requirement when direct 
imposition of the requirement would require just compensation.238 
Under a new approach formulated by the Nollan court, the "sub-
stantial relationship" test, the government's power to forbid partic-
ular land uses to facilitate advancement of some legitimate police 
power purpose is contingent upon the government's ability to dem-
233 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. 
234Id. 
235Id. 
236Id. at 828-29. 
237 I d. at 831. Recall that a taking usually will be held where a permanent physical occupation 
exists. See supra notes 7l-106 and accompanying text. 
238 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. 
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onstrate that the prohibited land use furthers the same purpose 
which the government has advanced as justification. 239 
Prior to N ollan, the Supreme Court of California required only 
that conditions underlying the granting of a permit be connected 
"indirectly" to the project in question, and that there be a mere 
"reasonable relationship" between the government's power to forbid 
land use and the advancement of a legitimate purpose. 240 As has 
been noted previously, the California courts grant broad regulatory 
power to the California state legislature. A review of 1970's Califor-
nia appellate court takings decisions shows that the courts consis-
tently required a mere "reasonable relationship" between govern-
ment regulatory power and the advancement of a legitimate 
governmental purpose. This approach often allowed the imposition 
of permit conditions only distantly related to achieving the "purpose" 
of legislatively enacted regulatory statutes. An historical review of 
California legislative enactments provides further support for the 
"reasonable relationship" standard, under which the legislature en-
acted various programs setting criteria for state and local regulation 
of flood hazard areas. 241 
Nollan represents a significant new direction in the Court's tak-
ings analysis. Where the Court's historical concern has been pri-
marily with the question of how great a "diminution in value" is 
required to invoke the requirement for just compensation, the N ol-
lan Court shifted its attention to the "nexus" requirement that the 
statutory enactment substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests.242 The N ollan decision, however, may have been foreshadowed 
in the California courts. 
The courts of California have long recognized that in a situation 
where, for example, city government orders a landowner to convey 
a strip of his or her land for a public street, it is beyond dispute that 
a classic taking will be found. 243 The status of California law prior to 
239Id. at 837. 
240 See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 
Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). 
241 See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 8400-15 (West 1971). 
242 In a fascinating footnote, Justice Scalia noted that the takings nexus requirement is not 
the same as the nexus requirement in substantive due process and equal protection jurispru-
dence, where the mere finding that the state could rationally have decided that the statute 
might achieve the government's objective is sufficient. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. 
243 Justice Scalia agreed: 
Had California simply required the N ollans to make an easement across their beach-
front available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access 
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N allan regarding making the granting of a permit conditional on 
conveyance of a strip of land to the government, however, can prob-
ably be found in Ayres v. City Council. 244 Were the test in Ayres 
applied, the Court would have examined the extent that the Nollan's 
development itself generated the need for new public facilities. To 
the extent that new public facilities would need to be generated to 
support the Nollan's new home, the Nollans could be required to 
grant the easement. If the public was thereby benefited, that would 
be deemed to be merely an "incidental benefit." Therefore, under 
the Ayres test, the court should have refused to sustain land regu-
lations not directly serving a purpose connected with the land being 
developed. A good example of a pre-N allan California case where 
the Ayres test was applied is Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buel~­
aventura,245 where the court held that government could not force 
owners to give up their land as a condition for obtaining a building 
permit, when the condition imposed had no connection to the pro-
posed development. 246 
While it is not at all clear why the California court did not apply 
the Ayres test in N allan, it can be argued that the N ollans should 
have prevailed under the Ayres test. In Nollan, however, the Su-
preme Court, though not directly addressing Ayres, ruled that trans-
forming what is essentially a taking of property into a building 
permit condition in no way distinguishes it from a pure taking. 247 
Nollan's nexus test can therefore be seen largely as a clarification 
of Ayres. Both the Nollan and Ayres tests rein in the government's 
ability to demand that developers provide community benefits only 
remotely related to the development. 
The N ollans tore down the bungalow and purchased the property 
while an appeal was pending in the California appellate courts. 248 
Unlike facial challenges, the "as applied" challenge characterized by 
Nollan raises the issue of ripeness. Under most circumstances, the 
Supreme Court will not find a taking claim ripe until the original 
governmental decisionmaker has arrived at a definite position, con-
clusively determining whether the property owner was denied "all 
to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their 
agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking. 
Id. at 831. 
244 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). 
245 28 Cal. App. 3d 624, 104 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1972). 
246Id. 
247 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
248Id. at 829-30. 
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reasonable beneficial use of its property. "249 A court can conclude, 
however, that the probability that a permit application will be 
granted for any use is so low as to render it a virtual impossibility. 
In this circumstance, the requirement to file for a permit is waived 
and the takings claim is rendered ripe for review without exhaustion 
of this (no longer) potential remedy. Therefore, recalling Keystone, 
instead of being required to show that the regulation denied them 
all economically viable use of the property,250 as would a facial chal-
lenger, the N ollans in their "as applied" challenge needed only to 
convince the Court of the regulation's economic impact and the ex-
tent of its interference with investment-backed expectations. 251 
The status of takings analysis after N ollan therefore can be sum-
marized as follows: a plaintiff property owner may attempt to inval-
idate a land control statute by mounting either a facial or an "as 
applied" challenge on either of two distinct grounds. First, under a 
so-called "economic impact" prong, a taking will be found if no rea-
sonable economically viable use of the property is provided.252 The 
scope of this first basis for challenge, however, has been narrowed 
significantly by the decision in Florida Rock Industries v. United 
States. 253 In Florida Rock, the court held that denial of a permit is 
not a taking unless it has a sufficiently severe effect on the fair 
market value of the property, even though the permit denial pre-
vents any immediate viable use of the land in question. 254 Thus, even 
where no potentially profitable use is left to the landowner, there 
still might not be a taking if the property can be sold to a speculative 
buyer. Recall, again, that denial of the land's most profitable use is 
not a taking nor, under Penn Central's "whole parcel" rule as rei-
terated by Keystone, is it a taking where an owner's use on a part 
of the land is restricted. 
Second, under the Nollan public purpose prong, a landowner may 
challenge a land use restriction statute as failing to substantially 
further a legitimate governmental purpose, or for failing to demon-
strate a direct nexus between the statute and that legislative pur-
249 Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 196-97 
(1985). 
250 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987). 
251 [d. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979». 
252 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131, 136 (1978). 
253 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
254 [d. at 905; see also V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, supra note 202, § 13:1, 
at 1507. 
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pose. 255 Hence, the government must satisfy both prongs for the 
statute to be ruled constitutional, while a plaintiff landowner can 
challenge either prong to warrant a finding of unconstitutionality 
and to obtain a court order for the government to render just com-
pensation. 
The N ollan decision has sparked a good deal of speculation and 
commentary in the popular press. Much of the speculation concludes 
that N ollan will discourage future regulation of water-related land 
use. Similarly, Nollan's nexus requirement raises some direct con-
cerns in the context of the NFIP. Specifically, when communities 
enact regulations whose basis-in-fact is an attempt to curb expansion 
in the floodplain, the courts might find that the marginal growth 
arising out of a single development constitutes a harm of sufficient 
degree to warrant imposition of the restraint without requiring com-
pensation. 256 Alternatively, it is also possible that courts relying on 
N ollan might find that the correlation between the public interest 
and prohibition of a particular development is not sufficient to sub-
stantially advance the state interest. The issue of retroactivity is 
also of tremendous concern to the NFIP. Whether landowners and 
developers acting within the statute of limitations have standing to 
contest previously accepted "burdensome conditions" placed in them 
by their NFIP communities is left unresolved in the wake of Nol-
lan. 257 
One potentially devastating result of N ollan is its apparent shift-
ing of the burden of proof. The state will now be required to prove 
that its legislation satisfies the nexus requirement, rather than the 
plaintiff landowner having to demonstrate insufficient nexus. 258 In 
many instances, the imposition of this burden will require the gov-
ernment to produce voluminous amounts of statistical data to justify 
regulation. In this area, the NFIP is well ahead of the game. Pres-
ently, virtually all flood-prone areas in the nation have been delin-
eated and mapped, flood studies supporting the formulation of NFIP 
policy have been undertaken with mathematical precision, and the 
Federal Insurance Administrator has not effected rate or rule revi-
sions without full documentation and impact analysis. It is therefore 
255 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987). 
255 Even before Nollan, some courts had already expressed hostility to floodplain regulations 
attempting to ban construction in already built-up beach areas. See, e.g., Annicelli v. Town 
of South Kingston, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983). 
257 See Goldfarb, The "Taking" Doctrine and Water Resources, 23 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 
971 (Oct. 1987). 
258 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. 
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doubtful that N allan will affect the NFIP other than by possibly 
launching significant increases in litigation, at least for the foresee-
able future, until the furor dies down. 
General NFIP regulations significantly differ from the very spe-
cific N allan permit requirement scenario. Requiring the establish-
ment of drainage channels, designating detention areas for flood 
runoff, and requiring setback lines and construction codes are ar-
guably directly correlated to government hazard reduction goals. In 
N allan, however, the relationship between the restriction and the 
regulatory goal was, at the very least, tenuous. In conclusion, the 
dissimilarity of the greater N allan scenario from most contemporary 
environmental regulatory provisions, coupled with the particular 
breadth of distinction between Nallan and NFIP floodplain manage-
ment regulations, translates to little bottom line impact on the con-
stitutionality of the National Flood Insurance Program. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
There are few "new" practical results emerging from the Supreme 
Court's 1987 takings Trilogy that impact on the National Flood 
Insurance Program. The few items of lasting significance to land use 
regulations in general and to the NFIP in particular are as follows. 
(1) The "Lutherglen Rule." Where land use regulations deprive 
the owner of all use of his or her property, the government may be 
required to render just compensation even if the taking is of tem-
porary duration. 
(2) A plaintiff possibly may sue for damages under a "taking" 
cause of action even prior to the invalidation of a regulatory statute, 
or recision of the statute by the government. 
(3) Because the cases have not resolved the outstanding question 
of whether just compensation is required in nuisance prohibition 
situations where legitimate governmental regulation of the property 
leaves its owner with no reasonable use of all of his or her land, a 
carefully tailored regulation should ensure that same use of the land 
is left to the owner. 259 
(4) A property owner may challenge a land use statute on either 
of two alternative grounds: 
259 Courts may construe "some use" very broadly, considerably curtailing plaintiffs' effective 
use of this first prong. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). 
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(a) under the "economic impact" prong, a taking will be found if 
the statute has left the landowner no minimally economic viable use 
of the property; 
(b) under the Nollan nexus prong, the statute must substan-
tially further a legitimate governmental purpose and have a direct 
nexus to that legislative purpose. 
To sustain its regulation, the government must withstand challenges 
to both prongs. 
As the result of the Trilogy, it is expected that the courts will 
scrutinize more closely both the regulatory purpose underlying land 
use statutory enactments and the nexus relationship of statutes to 
purported regulatory goals. It has been demonstrated, however, that 
the NFIP is situated in much the same advantageous position it 
enjoyed prior to First English, Keystone, and Nollan, and has little 
cause for the constitutional fear engendered in some circles by the 
three decisions. Considering the hundreds of flood hazard-related 
land use regulations upheld by the court compared to the handful of 
those overturned,260 it is more than likely that the courts will con-
tinue to sustain soundly conceived and fairly administered floodplain 
regulations and loss mitigation statutes. 
260 See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 314, 191 A.2d 770, 
775 (1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 
N.J. 539, 560, 193 A.2d 232, 244 (1963). 
